【大学院課題例】 国際法と国益の関係とは？（英語論文サンプル）

下記は、イギリスの大学院で課題用に書いたエッセイです。大学院に通っている方、又は通う予定の方に参考になれば幸いです。（改めて読み返すと修正すべき点が多々あるのですが、参考になるよう、修正せずに掲載します。）

課題

下記が課題です。これは外交のクラスの課題でしたが、問いが曖昧でした。したがって、まずは問題の定義から始めています。次に、国際関係論の３つの理論から見た「国益」を論じ、最後に中国の南シナ海問題をケーススタディーとして取り上げました。

To what extent is the national interest shaped by states relations with institutions? (2,000 Words)

エッセイ

This essay will evaluate the extent to which the national interest is shaped by states relations with institutions by determining the institutions’ influence. It will argue that institutions only have limited influence over states shaping national interests. Firstly, this essay will briefly define essential terms. Secondly, it will examine how international relations theories, classical realism, neorealism, and neoliberalism, perceive the relationship between institutions and states’ national interests. Thirdly, it will analyze how these theories fit into an empirical case of China’s paradoxical behavior in the South China Sea. Then, it will conclude that institutions do not affect states shaping their national interests.

I. Definitions

Before analyzing theories and an empirical case, it is necessary to define relevant terms: national interest and institutions. Firstly, the theoretical concept of national interest is “almost always contested” (Nye and Welch 2013, p.54). As it will be discussed in more detail later in this paper, however, this essay concisely refers to the concept as “the basic determinants that guide state policy in relation to the external environment” (Evans and Newnham 1999, p.344). Secondly, this essay regards the concept of institutions as a synonym for regimes. According to Krasner’s widely accepted definition, it is defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982, p.186). Since Krasner’s definition offers a relatively broad perspective, this essay defines institutions succinctly as “a rule-enforcing mechanism” such as international organizations and international law (Elster 1989). Thus, paraphrasing its argument, this essay will consider whether a rule-enforcing mechanism influences the basic determinants that guide state policy in relation to the external environment.

II. Theories
1. Classical Realism

The concept of national interests is significantly associated with the school of realism (Evans and Newnham 1999). Its most prominent advocate, Hans Morgenthau, claims, in his book, Politics Among Nations, that “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (Morgenthau 1948, p.5). Thus, he assumes that politicians think and act in terms of interest (Morgenthau 1948). Also, He states that there are two elements in the concept of national interest: an immutably required element and a variable element determined by circumstances (Morgenthau 1952). The former element refers to protecting the physical, political, and cultural identity of states. The latter element refers to integrated sectional interests that emerge from public opinions, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways (Morgenthau 1952). Morgenthau (1952, p.977) argues that states prioritize the immutable element over the variable element so that “in the end all of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of national survival.”

Concerning the relationship between institutions and national interests, Morgenthau doubts that institutions affect states shaping national interests (Morgenthau 1954). He criticizes the optimistic view on the role of institutions, noting that “what challenges the national interest here is a mere figment of the imagination, a product of wishful thinking, which is postulated as a valid norm for international conduct, without being valid either there or anywhere else” (Morgenthau 1954, p.976). Thus, according to classical realists like Morgenthau, states prioritize their national interest for their survival above all else; therefore, institutions possess no influence over states shaping national interests.

2. Neorealism

Neorealism also argues that institutions affect states’ national interests only in a limited manner. Notably, there is a slight difference in perspectives on the concept of national interest between classical realism and neorealism. Classical realism perceives national interests as objective, whereas neorealism sees them as subjective (Donnelly 2000). Neorealists, or structural realists, assume that the structure of the international system forces states to act in certain ways (Mearsheimer 2007). Thus, neorealists suggest that “the appropriate state action is calculated according to the situation in which the state finds itself” (Waltz 1979, p.134). Therefore, states shape national interests in a form to adapt to the structure of international society.

One of the prominent neorealists, John Mearsheimer (2001), primarily known as an offensive neorealist, argues that states act based on their self-interest and do not subordinate to other states’ interest or the international community’s interest in an anarchic international society because “it pays to be selfish in a self-help world” (p.33). Therefore, he claims that institutions only have limited influence over states by saying that “what is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behavior” (Mearsheimer 1994, p.47). Therefore, despite the difference in the concept of national interests, classical realism and neorealism both asseverate that institutions do not affect states shaping their national interests.

3. Neoliberalism

In contrast, neoliberalism explains that institutions do affect states shaping national interests. As a premise, neoliberalism does not oppose the neorealism view, in which states pursue their self-interests in an anarchic international society. Based on such realism perspective, the prominent neoliberalist Robert Keohane (1984, p. 52) explains that while each state pursues its national interest, it also “looks for bargains that can benefit all parties to the deal.” In this meaning, intergovernmental cooperation occurs when states adjust their behavior for others’ interests through a process of policy coordination (Keohane 1984). In such a circumstance, institutions play an essential role in realizing such states’ cooperation by providing information and a framework that shapes expectations (Keohane 1984). Therefore, neoliberalism assumes that institutions mitigate the negative effects of anarchy and ensure interests are sufficiently obtained (Folker 2007; Nye and Welch 2013).

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that neoliberalists acknowledge that institutions affect states’ interests in a limited manner because “these interests do not always accord with the greater good” (Folker 2007). For institutions to appropriately function as a rule-enforcing mechanism, neoliberalism indicates that states “must accept restraints on their domestic or international behavior” (Keohane and Nye 1977, p. 271). However, states rarely accept such restraints, especially in their area of security, as Keohane (1984, p. 247) admits that “institution-building may be more difficult where security issues are concerned.” Mearsheimer (1994) highlights this weakness in the neoliberalism argument, stating that it “largely ignores security issues” (p.15). Therefore, neoliberalism suggests that institutions affect states shaping their national interest. However, it contrastingly addresses that institutions have limited influence over states in the security field.

III. The South China Sea

This essay will further evaluate China’s pursuit of its national interest in the South China Sea as empirical material to further discuss how institutions do not influence states shaping their national interests. There are complex territorial disputes in the South China Sea over islands and reefs among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan (Nye and Welch 2013). China has proclaimed most of the South China Sea as its territory under the so-called nine-dash line (Council on Foreign Relations 2020). The turning point was July 12, 2016, when a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) issued a decision in a case the Philippines brought in 2013 to challenge China’s maritime claims (Rapp-Hooper 2016). The tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines on almost every count and declared China’s claims illegal under international law (Rapp-Hooper 2016). As a state that respects international law, China finds the tribunal ruling troublesome because it regards the South China Sea as its “core interest.” (Yoshihara and Holmes 2011, p.45).

China has shown paradoxical behavior in the South China Sea. On the one hand, China has been emphasizing the importance of compliance with international law. However, on the other hand, China has been ignoring international law in the South China Sea. Primarily, China has been proclaiming the importance of international law in the international political arena. For instance, China’s chairperson of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, Fu Ying, gave a speech at Chatham House in London on July 6, 2016. He emphasized how China respects international law by proclaiming that “China is part of international order,” which refers to “the UN and its institutions including the principles of international law” (Chatham House 2016). Furthermore, Chinese President Xi Jinping asserted the importance of compliance with international law at the United Nations Office at Geneva on January 18, 2017, stating:

All countries and international judicial institutions should ensure equal and uniform application of international law and reject double standards and the practice of applying international law in a selective way, thus ensuring genuine equality and justice in the world (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland 2017).

Thus, it is evident that China appreciates the role of international law in international society. However, simultaneously, China paradoxically ignores it in the South China Sea. Even though China’s claims were found invalid under international law, China continues its unlawful activities in the South China Sea to this day. For instance, in August 2020, Chinese vessels showed provocative actions against the Philippines near the Reed Bank, which the Philippines proclaims as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under the 2016 arbitration ruling (Robles 2020). Being aware of Chinese actions, the Philippines has appealed its legitimacy to the United Nations. On September 22, 2020, the Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte delivered a pre-recorded speech reaffirming the 2016 ruling to the opening of the 75th session of the General Assembly (Strangio 2020). Also, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has recently criticized China’s behavior in the South China Sea, stating that:

Beijing uses intimidation to undermine the sovereign rights of Southeast Asian coastal states in the South China Sea, bully them out of offshore resources, assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with ‘might makes right’ (U.S. Department of State 2020).

However, despite these criticisms, there has been no sign showing that China will change its attitude accordingly to international law.

Theoretically, China’s paradoxical attitude towards institutions can only be described in the realism logic. China has ignored international law and prioritized its national interest in the South China Sea because survival is a paramount goal for states. The South China Sea is “vitally important for China” for its survival because there is the security of sea lanes of communication (SLOC) (Hemmings 2018). China is heavily dependent on the SLOC, where approximately 39.5% of all China’s trade in goods has transited in 2016 (China Power Project 2020). Therefore, China perceives the South China Sea as its “core security interests” (Rühlig 2018). Consequently, as Morgenthau (1952, p.977) described as “all objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of national survival,” China prioritizes its national interest for its security in the South China Sea, even though China appreciates institutions such as international law. Thus, the South China Sea case presents a convincing example that illustrates, as one of the realists John Mearsheimer (1994, p.7) argued, “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior.”

Conclusion

This essay defined relevant terms: national interests and institutions. Then, it evaluated three theories, classical realism, neorealism, and neoliberalism, to determine the extent to which states’ national interests are relations with institutions. Classical realism and neorealism assert that institutions do not influence states shaping national interests. In contrast, neoliberalism argues that institutions do affect them; however, in a limited manner. The South China Sea case presents that states prioritize their national interest to survive over other values, as classical realism and neorealism explain. Therefore, it can be concluded that institutions only possess limited influence over states shaping national interests.

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