Emotion and felt sense
Gendlin’s distinction between emotion and felt sense (direct referent) became increasingly important. I will first review the history of his distinction between these two types of feelings. Next, I will examine how what is discussed in “A Process Model” (APM) corresponds to the practice of Focusing. Finally, I will point out that despite the distinction between the two types of feelings, they are seen as a continuum in practice.
Transition of the distinction between the two types of feelings
In “a) Introduction” in Chapter VIII of APM, emotion is discussed as one of the VII sequences before felt sense or direct referent is formed:
First, I would like to trace how Gendlin distinguished between “direct referent (felt sense)” and “emotion.”
Felt meaning, the previous name for felt sense, was first proposed in Gendlin’s philosophical book “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning” (1962/1997). At that time, however, it was not clearly distinguished from emotion.
In his psychotherapeutic paper “A Theory of Personality Change” in the early 1960s, the distinction between felt meaning (direct referent) and sheer emotion was first made explicit in a footnote (Gendlin, 1964, pp. 123-4).
In his philosophical paper “A Phenomenology of Emotions: Anger” in the early 1970s, he wrote that “emotions make us act in ways we may regret later .... And, blowing up angrily is very rarely that behavior which takes account of all of the situation” (Gendlin, 1973, p. 378), which would become a precursor to later APM.
In his psychotherapeutic paper “The Client’s Client” in the early 1980s, he continued to contrast emotion with felt sense. Emotion such as anger “comes in a certain slot in a story and carries it forward in a partial way” but “does not carry forward the whole situation” (Gendlin, 1984, p. 102)
Limitation of emotion: narrowed scope
In his philosophical paper “Thinking beyond Patterns” in the early 1990s, he wrote that “emotions narrow one’s scope and make one miss some of a present situation” (Gendlin, 1991b, p. 101). Still, the paper did not discuss the reasons for narrowing one’s scope.
In his psychotherapeutic paper of the same year, “On Emotion in Therapy,” the reason for the narrowed scope was more convincingly discussed. In this paper, he pointed out the difference between animals and us: “…animals have their feelings only in-action, not as inward things in an inward space” (Gendlin, 1991a, p. 260). Whereas “The emotions of animals are just as valid as ours” (Gendlin, 1991a, p. 260) and their similarity is discussed as follows:
So he ended by saying, “When we act in anger, we often feel sorry later because we reacted only to a part of the situation. When we are calmer, we recall the whole of the situation” (Gendlin, 1996, p. 58) in “Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy.”
Felt sense or direct referent: sensing the whole thing as a whole
The importance of forming a direct referent to recall the whole of the situation is discussed in “b) Direct referent and felt shift” in Chapter VIII of APM:
Correspondence between APM and focusing practice
If I apply the APM text above specifically to a Focusing practice, the following conversation segment in paperback, “Focusing,” would be appropriate.
Not only in FOCUSER [1] but also in FOCUSER [2], “I am angry,” “Always gray,” and “Always down...” and the focuser went over and over these emotions and situational contexts. The statements in FOCUSER [1] & [2] could be rated as level 3, which is not very high on “The experiencing scales” (Klein et al., 1986), consisting of the seven levels. The listener had to make the focuser stop going through these VII sequences, so the listener interrupted and encouraged the focuser to sense the whole thing as a whole by saying, “See what more is in it.”
Continuity of emotion and felt sense
As we have seen above, Gendlin has clearly distinguished between emotion and felt sense over the years. Nevertheless, in practice, he is not saying that emotion should be eliminated to form a felt sense separate from it. In the conversation portion above, the listener is not saying “other than it” or “outside of it” but “See what more is in it.”
Consider the following passage from “Focusing-Oriented Psychotherapy,” a more practical book than APM:
The following passage seems to be an excellent example of how the emotion called “sadness” can trigger the formation of a felt sense:
“We can explain our emotions in terms of common phrases and patterns of situations” (Gendlin, 1996, p. 60) such as “I feel sad. ... Because my cat died.” “And perhaps it seems that this sort of event would evoke the same emotion in any person. And that is as far as an emotion goes” (Gendlin, 1996, p. 62) and its limits, Gendlin points out. That is why we need to form a felt sense. The felt sense implicitly contains all that has made you sad, “the sense of the whole situation, all that led up to it, and how it involves you” (Gendlin, 1996, p. 61). That is why we explicate what is implicitly contained in it by “asking” (Gendlin, 1981, p. 57-60; 1996, pp. 73-4) in the 6 Movements or Steps, such as “Exactly what is it about my cat dying, that makes me feel so sad?”
Conclusion
As described above, the contrast between emotion and felt sense was discussed as an essential issue in his practical and theoretical/philosophical writings. While theoretically understanding the function and characteristics of both feelings is vital, facilitating a smooth transition from emotion to felt sense in Focusing practice is also vital.
Acknowledgments
The “Continuity of emotion and felt Sense” section was newly added through a dialogue with Vera Rolfine Fryd Lyngmo and Frans Depestele.
References
Gendlin, E.T. (1964). A theory of personality change. In P. Worchel & D. Byrne (eds.), Personality change (pp. 100-48). John Wiley & Sons.
Gendlin, E.T. (1973). A phenomenology of emotions: Anger. In D. Carr & E.S. Casey (Eds.), Explorations in phenomenology: papers of the society for phenomenology and existential philosophy (pp. 367-98). Martinus Nijhoff.
Gendlin, E.T. (1981). Focusing. 2nd ed. Bantam. Books.
Gendlin, E.T. (1984). The client’s client: The edge of awareness. In R.L. Levant & J.M. Shlien (Eds.), Client-centered therapy and the person-centered approach. new directions in theory, research and practice (pp. 76-107). Praeger.
Gendlin, E.T. (1991a). On emotion in therapy. In J.D. Safran & L.S. Greenberg (Eds.), Emotion, psychotherapy and change (pp. 255-79). Guilford.
Gendlin, E.T. (1991b). Thinking beyond patterns: body, language and situations. In B. den Ouden & M. Moen (Eds.), The presence of feeling in thought (pp. 25-151). Peter Lang.
Gendlin, E. T. (1996). Focusing-oriented psychotherapy: a manual of the experiential method. Guilford Press.
Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.
Klein, M. H., Mathieu-Coughlan, P., & Kiesler, D. J. (1986). The experiencing scales. In L. S. Greenberg & W. M. Pinsof (Eds.), The psychotherapeutic process: a research handbook (pp. 21–71). Guilford Press.