Collection of Links: George Herbert Mead’s philosophy as one of the roots of “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018)
In “A Process Model (APM)” (Gendlin, 1997/2018), various philosophers who preceded Gendlin are mentioned, either directly or indirectly. In this blog post, I have chosen the philosophies of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931).
One of Mead’s students when he was a professor at the University of Chicago was Charles Morris (1903–1979). Morris compiled Mead’s lectures from his later years and published them as “Mind, Self, and Society” (Mead, 1934). He later became a professor at the same university and taught Gendlin about philosophy as his doctoral advisor (*1). In other words, Gendlin was a student of one of Mead’s students.
It should be noted that Campbell Purton and Donata Schoeller have previously studied the influence of Mead on Gendlin (Purton, 2007, September; Schoeller & Dunaetz, 2018).
G. H. Mead was concerned with “the interaction of organisms with their environment like J. Dewey. Furthermore, I also see his theory of time (Mead, 1932) as influencing “Chapter IV: The Body and Time” and his theory of symbols (Mead, 1934) as influencing “Chapter VII: Culture, Symbol, and Language” in APM.
Collection of links to my blog posts
Below, I will provide links to the chapters of APM that correspond to each of my previous blog posts.
“Chapter II: Functional Cycle (Fucy)”
History of chapters II and I use of the term “implying” in “A Process Model”: with reference to Mead and Dewey.
Abstract: In “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018), the basic term “implying” is used frequently. This term was first used in his earlier published papers (Gendlin, 1973a; 1973b). It is my view at this stage that the various uses of “implying” developed along the following historical lines: First, in the early 1970s, Gendlin began the “bringing or generating time” use of implying corresponding to Chapter II of APM. Next, in the late 1980s, he started the “horizontal” use of implying corresponding to Chapter I of “A Process Model” (APM). Finally, the other uses of implying were formulated with the writing of APM.
“Chapter IV-A: A Different Concept of the Body, Not a Machine”
Gendlin’s position against the “unit model” or the “content paradigm”: retroactive time in terms of G. H. Mead’s theory of time.
Abstract: Gendlin’s idea that living processes cannot be predicted in advance leads to another important idea: the past is reviewed “ex post facto” from the present perspective. However, we tend to fall prey to the illusion that elements that should have been discovered later existed unchanged beforehand. This illusion was represented by his terms “unit model” or “content paradigm.”
“Chapter V-A: Intervening Events”
Pragmatistic origins of Gendlin’s en#0: with reference to Dewey and Mead.
Abstract: In “A process model,” en#0 is mentioned less often than en#2 and en#3. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that “just because it gets rarely mentioned doesn’t mean it is not structurally important.” (Jaaniste, 2021, April). There are many possible backgrounds for Gendlin’s deliberate assumption of en#0. In my view, one of the anticipations of en#0 can be found in the concept of the “natural world” that appears in John Dewey’s later work, “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.” Finally, I suggest that we can also see some points in the ideas and terminology of en#0 that are closer to G. H. Mead than to J. Dewey.
“Chapter VI-B: The Development of Behavior Space” & “Chapter III: An Object”
A preliminary examination of the concept of “object”: from G. H. Mead to Gendlin in the 1980s.
Abstract: In the early 1980s, Gendlin began a preliminary examination of what an “object” is to living processes. By “preliminary,” I mean that at that time, Gendlin was examining only objects for animals that had acquired perception and behavior, following George Herbert Mead. In other words, he had not yet arrived at the consideration of an “object” in Chapter III of “A Process Model (APM)” (Gendlin, 1997/2018) that also applies to unicellular organisms or plants.
“Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” & “Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage”
Animals don’t “express” each other (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 1).
Abstract: Gendlin’s theory of “animal gestures” has its roots in the previous studies of Charles Darwin, Wilhelm Wundt, and George Herbert Mead. In this article, I would like to focus on how Darwin’s theory of the expression of emotions was criticized by subsequent generations.
The three-step “order” beginning with “animal gestures” (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”— Gendlin and Mead: 2).
Abstract: In the section “c) The order” in “Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage” of “A Process Model” (APM), Gendlin briefly describes the three-step order from animal gestures to the primitive language called “protolanguage.” In APM, he also refers to Mead when discussing the second step, but as far as I can tell from actually reading Mead’s work, the second step does not seem to be discussed in much detail. Rather, in Mead’s writings, it seems that the contrast between the first and third steps is discussed more centrally, skipping the second step, in terms of “the order” by Gendlin.
“Gestures” do not exist without the other animal (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”: Gendlin and Mead: 3).
Abstract: For both Gendlin and Mead, “animal gestures” such as “body looks, sounds, and moves” are gestures that are only possible when the other animal responds to them. Moving their arms and legs in the same way without the other animal cannot be called “animal gestures” in the sense that they later evolve into human language.
Fighting does not occur in a “truncated act” (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 4).
Abstract: When Gendlin uses the example of a “threat gesture” and says, “Fighting is focally implied, but fighting is not occurring” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” this would correspond to what Mead calls a “truncated act.” This “not fighting” is thought to be related to the concept of "pause. I have discussed how “pause” is related to the capacity for "aboutness" not only in relation to Mead but also in relation to Langer.
How we know what our bodies look like (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 5).
Abstract: In the section “c) Representation” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” Gendlin discusses the difficult question of “how I can know what my body looks like” in the context of discussing “empathy” and argues that G. H. Mead reversed the conventional order.
Self-consciousness emerging from gestural communication (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 6).
Abstract: In the section “f) The new kind of CF” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” “self-consciousness” is discussed for the first time. However, the discussion is abrupt, and it may be difficult for the reader to immediately connect the discussion of gestures and the discussion of self-consciousness just by reading this section. If we go back to the discussion by Mead that Gendlin seems to have referred to, it is easier to understand that the evolution of gestures and the emergence of self-consciousness are related.
Note
*1) For more information on the influence of Morris’s philosophy on “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning” (Gendlin, 1962/1997), please see the following blog post:
References
Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.
Mead, G.H. (1932). The philosophy of the present (edited by A.E. Murphy). Open Court.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. (edited by C.W. Morris). University of Chicago Press.
Purton, C. (2007, September). How self-awareness arises from sentience: Mead and Gendlin, Paper presented at the 11th Annual Conference of the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society.
Schoeller, D. & Dunaetz, N. (2018). Thinking emergence as interaffecting: approaching and contextualizing Eugene Gendlin’s Process Model. Continental Philosophy Review, 51, 123–140.