Collection of links: Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead

This blog post is a collection of links to my series of blog posts discussing the influence of Georg Herbert Mead’s philosophy on “Chapter VII: Culture, Symbol, and Language” of “A Process Model (APM)” (Gendlin, 1997/2018).

In his early philosophical masterpiece, “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (ECM)” (Gendlin, 1962/1997), Gendlin examined in detail how symbol and felt meaning function together. Thus, “symbol” is a key term in his philosophy. However, this book did not consider how humans can recognize things as symbols.

This unresolved issue in ECM was discussed in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” in his later philosophical masterpiece, APM. In this book, he considered the gradual acquisition of symbolic recognition during the intermediate stages of evolution from animals to humans. In my view, the two philosophers who most influenced Gendlin’s consideration of the symbolic process in Chapter VII-A were G. H. Mead (1863–1931) and Susanne Langer (1895–1985).

Mead’s representative book is “Mind, Self, and Society” (Mead, 1934). This book is a collection of lectures from his later years, edited and published by his student Charles W. Morris (1903–1979). Morris was an advisor for Gendlin’s doctoral dissertation (Gendlin, 1958), the original ECM.

In the following six blog posts, I have compared Mead's theory of animal gestures with Chapter VII-A of APM:

1. Animals don’t “express” each other.
Abstract: Gendlin’s theory of “animal gestures” has its roots in the previous studies of Charles Darwin, Wilhelm Wundt, and George Herbert Mead. Here, I would like to focus on how Darwin’s theory of the expression of emotions was criticized by subsequent generations.

2. The three-step “order” beginning with “animal gestures”.
Abstract: In the section “c) The order” in “Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage” of “A Process Model” (APM), Gendlin succinctly describes the three-step order from animal gestures to the primitive language called “protolanguage.” In APM, he also refers to Mead when discussing the second step, but as far as I can tell from actually reading Mead’s work, the second step does not seem to be discussed in much detail. Rather, in Mead’s writings, it seems that the contrast between the first and third steps is discussed more centrally, skipping the second step, in terms of “the order” by Gendlin.

3. “Gestures” do not exist without the other animal.
Abstract: For both Gendlin and Mead, “animal gestures” such as “body looks, sounds, and moves” are gestures that are only possible when the other animal responds to them. Moving their arms and legs in the same way without the other animal cannot be called “animal gestures” in the sense that they later evolve into human language.

4. Fighting does not occur in a “truncated act”.
Abstract: When Gendlin uses the example of a “threat gesture” and says, “Fighting is focally implied, but fighting is not occurring,” this would correspond to what Mead calls “truncated acts.” Anyway, simply raising the arm with the fist changes the behavior context without the actual behavior of hitting the other.

5. How we know what our bodies look like.
Abstract: In the section “c) Representation” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” Gendlin discusses the difficult question of “how I can know what my body looks like” in the context of discussing “empathy” and argues that G. H. Mead reversed the conventional order.

6. Self-consciousness emerging from gestural communication.
Abstract: In the section “f) The new kind of CF” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” “self-consciousness” is discussed for the first time. However, the discussion is abrupt, and it may be difficult for the reader to immediately connect the discussion of gestures and the discussion of self-consciousness just by reading this section. If we go back to the discussion by Mead that Gendlin seems to have referred to, it is easier to understand that the evolution of gestures and the emergence of self-consciousness are related.

P. S.

Incidentally, for more information on the influence of Langer (1942/1957) on Chapter VII-A of APM, please see my other blog post, “Responding to a picture as a picture: Eugene Gendlin and Susanne Langer.” This post is linked to the fourth post above, “Fighting does not occur in a ‘truncated act.’” Both posts discuss Gendlin’s term “aboutness.”

References

Gendlin, E.T. (1958). The Function of Experiencing in Symbolization. Doctoral dissertation. University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy.

Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Langer, S.K. (1942/1957). Philosophy in a new key: a study in the symbolism of reason, rite, and art (3rd ed.). Harvard University Press.

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. (edited by C.W. Morris). University of Chicago Press.