【大学課題例】安全保障のジレンマの回帰分析（英語論文サンプル）

下記は、イギリスの大学院で課題用に書いたエッセイです。大学院に通っている方、又は通う予定の方に参考になれば幸いです。（改めて読み返すと修正すべき点が多々あるのですが、参考になるよう、修正せずに掲載します。）

課題

データ分析のコースの課題です。冷戦後のインド太平洋地域における安全保障のジレンマについて、重回帰分析を行いました。

Analyze a public policy issue using regression analysis. (2,500 Words)

エッセイ

Enigma of Security Dilemma in the Indo-Pacific region

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to assess a security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. Many observers suggest that an arms race is underway in the Indo-Pacific region and point to the security dilemma as a driving force (Liff & Ikenberry 2014; Wuthnow 2019). However, despite the logic of the security dilemma, by conducting multivariate regression analysis on the military expenditure of each country in the region, this report finds that the security dilemma cannot be acknowledged. Focusing on Japan, this report further analyzes the reasons for the absence of security dilemma in the Japan-China relationship. The results show that the security dilemma has not occurred between the two rivalries because Japan’s military expenditure is determined by its economic factors, not by the external threat from China’s military expansion.

Related Work

2.1 Security Dilemma
According to Robert Jervis (1978, 169), a security dilemma is defined as “a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.” According to the logic of the security dilemma, when a state enhances its security, its neighbor states feel threatened; therefore, they choose to increase their military capability in order to maximize their security (Wivel 2021). As a result, the increase in military capability leads to a security spiral and an arms race in which countries respond by increasing their military expenditure (Ibid.).

Security dilemma has been one of the most crucial theoretical ideas in international relations for both neorealism and neoliberalism (Tang 2009). For realists, it is the security dilemma that makes war inevitable (Allison 2015; Mearsheimer 2001). According to an offensive neorealist John Mearsheimer (2001, 19), because of the anarchic nature of the international environment, “little can be done to ameliorate the security dilemma.” On the other hand, neoliberal scholars argue that the security dilemma can be alleviated through international institutions based on the international regime theory (Keohane 1988). Nevertheless, despite the difference in perspectives, both theories similarly emphasize the existence and the risk of security dilemmas in international society (Tang 2009; Wivel 2021).

2.2 The Rise of China
Since the end of the Cold War, the rise of China has become apparent in international society. China has made great economic and military progress since the end of the Cold War. In 1992, China’s GDP was 426.916 billion dollars (World Bank 2021). By 2020, it had increased by 34-fold to 14.723 trillion dollars (Ibid.). Similarly, in terms of military power, its military expenditure increased more than 20-fold, from 12.244 billion dollars in 1992 to 252.304 billion dollars (The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2021). As a result, over the past three decades, China has risen from a marginal position to become the world’s second-largest economic and military power. Consequently, China has become, in the words of US president Joe Biden, the “most serious competitor” to the US and its alliance (The White House 2021).

Due to the rise of China in the post-Cold War era, many scholars began to observe the security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2014, Adam Liff and John Ikenberry (2014, 54) noted that with the rise of China, “there is already some evidence of security dilemma-driven military competition.” Similarly, John Mearsheimer (2014) argues that due to the security dilemma between China and the US, there is an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Joel Wuthnow (2019) also argues that the security dilemma has been playing a vital role in the increasing strategic competition between China and the US-led allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Koh Swee Lean Collin (2015) also indicates the security dilemma is plausibly extended between the two rising powers, China and India, in the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, throughout the post-Cold War era, scholars have widely regarded the Indo-pacific region as “ripe for rivalry” and at risk of intensifying military competition, based on the logic of the security dilemma (Friedberg 1994; Liff & Ikenberry 2014).

Although scholars of international relations consider the security dilemma as one of the essential aspects of international politics, quantitative studies have not been sufficiently conducted. The previous studies mentioned above are based on qualitative research, and few quantitative analyses of security dilemmas in the region have been done. In one of few studies, Chung-Nang Lai, Bwo-Nung Huang, and Chin-Wei Yang (2007), based on the logic of security dilemma, analyzed how Taiwan’s military expenditure is partly driven by China’s increased military expenditure. Their study, however, focuses narrowly on the Taiwan-China relationship. Ling Li, Ruixing Huang, and Dewei Wang (2015) quantitatively analyzed the security dilemma between China and its rivals. They argued that the military expenditure of the US, Japan, and South Korea show a statistically significant positive relationship with China’s military expenditure (Li, et al. 2015). However, their study needs to be revamped since they only used data from 2000 to 2012, when China was half of its national power in 2020 (World Bank 2021). Lacking an up-to-date quantitative analysis of security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific region from a broader perspective risks misinterpreting reality. Qualitative research runs the risk of subjective or irrefutable inferences, while quantitative analysis based on limited data may settle for inappropriate conclusions (Li, Huang, and Wang 2015). Therefore, this research attempts to provide a quantitative analysis of the security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era based on a wide range of recent data.

Method and Data

3.1 Method
An effective means of assessing the security dilemma is to evaluate the military expenditure of each country. While the increase in military expenditure is not the only type of state behavior that can be fueled by a security dilemma, as Li, Huang, and Wang (2015) argue, it is possible to judge whether there is a security dilemma based on a quantitative analysis of military expenditures. Previous studies that conducted quantitative analysis on security dilemmas assume that security dilemmas can be recognized if there is a statistically positive relationship between the military expenditure of two rival countries (Lai, et al. 2005; Li, et al. 2015). In other words, they assume that a security dilemma exists when an increase in the military expenditure of a rival country leads to an increase in the military expenditure of another country. Therefore, consistent with previous studies, this report quantitatively assesses the existence of security dilemmas based on the military expenditure of each country.

The influence of economic factors on military expenditure should not be overlooked. Previous qualitative and quantitative studies have shown that economic factors in each country affect military expenditure (Keohane 1988; Lai, et al. 2005; Li, et al. 2015; Mearsheimer 2001). For instance, Ling Li, Ruixing Huang, and Dewei Wang (2015) assessed the security dilemma using each country’s GDP and China’s military expenditure as independent variables. In addition, Lai, Huang, and Yang (2005) conducted a threshold regression analysis that included GDP, imports, and exports as well as military expenditure to analyze the security dilemma between China and Taiwan. Therefore, as previous studies have shown that economic factors affect a state’s military expenditure, this report also includes GDP, imports, and exports in the model to assess each country’s military expenditure and the security dilemma.

Regression analysis of panel data from 1992 to 2020 is used to empirically assess the presence of security dilemmas among countries in the Indo-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era (see Appendix I). Although there is no consensus among historians on the end of the Cold War, many scholars suggest the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26th, 1991 as the end of the Cold War (Service 2015). Thus, the period of the analysis is from 1992 to 2020. The data sources are SIPRI Yearbook for military expenditure and World Bank data for economic factors.

Dependent Variables
The dependent variable is the military expenditure of countries in the Indo-Pacific region that are considered China’s rivals. Liff and Ikenberry (2014) list the US, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, and Singapore as China’s rivals. Nevertheless, Vietnam cannot be analyzed quantitatively due to incomplete data on military expenditure (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2021). Moreover, as Collin (2015) indicates, India is also an important player in the region and is considered one of China’s rivals, with a potential risk of falling into a security dilemma with China (Medcalf 2018). Thus, the targeted countries in the model are the US, Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India.

Independent Variables
Independent variables are military expenditure of a rival country, China, and economic factors such as gross domestic products (GDP), imports of goods and services, and exports of goods and services. First, as mentioned earlier, in order to quantitatively analyze the existence of a security dilemma, the military expenditure of the rival country (in this case, China’s military expenditure) is necessary (Lai, et al. 2015; Li, et al. 2015). It should be noted, however, that the actual level of China’s military expenditure has been widely debated (China Power 2021). The amount announced by the Chinese government differs from estimates by think tanks such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2021) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2021) (Xinhua 2021). In this report, as in other previous studies, the data from the SIPRI Yearbook is used for China’s military expenditure (Lai, et al. 2005; Li, et al. 2015). Secondly, economic factors such as GDP, imports, and exports, are also included in the model. In addition, all independent variables are lagged by one year, as it is assumed that each country’s military expenditure is allocated based on the previous year’s external and domestic conditions (Lai, et al. 2015; Li, et al. 2015).

Results
Based on the fixed effects multivariate regression (see Appendix II), the analysis found that rival’s military expenditure and economic factors have a statistically significant impact on countries’ military expenditure. However, the security dilemma was not found in the Indo-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era.

First, with regard to rival’s military expenditure, the analysis reveals that China’s military expenditure has a statistically significant negative impact on the military expenditure of each country. In other words, when China’s military expenditure increases, the military expenditure of the target countries tends to decrease. This result is undeniably inconsistent with the logic of the security dilemma. According to the logic of the security dilemma, when a rival country increases its military expenditure, each country is expected to increase its military expenditure in response, resulting in a security spiral and an arms race (Wivel 2021). Therefore, if a security dilemma exists in the region, China’s military expenditure should have a positive impact on the military expenditure of each country in the region. However, the result of the analysis showed the opposite result. In this sense, despite the claims of previous qualitative studies, the security dilemma cannot be perceived quantitatively in the region (Collin 2015; Liff & Ikenberry 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Wuthnow 2019).

Second, considering economic factors, the analysis finds that GDP, imports of goods and services, and exports of goods and services have statistically significant impacts on countries’ military expenditure, as assumed by previous studies (Keohane 1988; Lai, et al. 2005; Li, et al. 2015; Mearsheimer 2001). According to the analysis, GDP growth leads to increased military expenditure in each country. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that while an increase in exports does not contribute to an increase in military expenditure, an increase in imports has a positive impact on military expenditure.

The Enigma of Security Dilemma: The Case of Japan

5.1 The Absence of the Security Dilemma between Japan and China
Why has the increase in the rival’s military expenditure did not cause neighboring countries to increase their military expenditure, despite the logic of the security dilemma? This report focuses on Japan to answer the question. Having been considered rivals to China throughout history, no country feels China’s rise more deeply than Japan (Smith 2015). However, as the fixed effects multivariate regression above indicated, the security dilemma was not recognized in the Indo-Pacific region in the post-Cold war era. Moreover, the same multivariate regression model focusing on the Japan-China relationship also suggests that China’s military expenditure does not have a statistically significant impact on Japan’s military expenditure (See Appendix III). In other words, the security dilemma has not occurred between the two rivals.

Why did the security dilemma between the two rivals not exist? The quantitative analysis suggests that economic stagnation prevented Japan from increasing its defense budget; consequently, the security dilemma between Japan and China did not occur. The multivariate regression on Japan indicates that Japan’s economic factors such as GDP, imports, and exports have a significant impact on Japan’s military expenditure (see Appendix IV). In other words, despite the logic of the security dilemma, Japan’s military expenditure is determined by economic factors, not by external threats such as China’s military expansion.

5.2 Japan’s Economic Stagnation
Japan has been suffering from economic stagnation since the 1990s, a phenomenon so-called “Lost Decades” (Yoshino & Taghizadeh-Hesary 2015). As a result, economic stagnation created a financial constraint on Japan’s national budget and its military expenditure (Ibid.). Indeed, the Japanese government has long had a concern about the strategic implication of its fiscal condition. For instance, the 2004 Japanese National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) highlights the fiscal constraints of Japan’s development of forces by writing that:

In developing Japan’s defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense has to play are multiplying…Fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2004).

Thus, the fiscal constraint caused by the “Lost Decades” prevented Japan from increasing its military expenditure despite China’s military buildup. In fact, between 1992 and 2020, Japan’s military expenditure only increased by 1.37 times, while China’s military expenditure increased more than 20 times (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2021). Therefore, as the multivariate regression model indicates, the economic stagnation has constrained an increase in Japan’s military expenditure in the post-Cold War era,

Conclusion

This report assessed the existence of security dilemmas in the Indo-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. Many observers suggest that the arms race in this region is underway due to the security dilemma. However, based on the fixed effects multivariate regression analysis, this report found that security dilemma cannot be recognized in the region. Focusing on Japan, this report further found that the security dilemma does not exist in the Japan-China relationship because Japan’s military expenditure is determined by its economic factors, not by the external threat posed by China’s military expansion. Further detailed studies should be conducted on other regional countries such as the US, Australia, Singapore, and India. Nevertheless, the security dilemma cannot be recognized quantitatively in the Indo-Pacific region in the post-Cold War era, and, considering the case of Japan, economic factors rather than external threats have determined countries’ military expenditure.

Appendix

Appendix I: Summary of All Variables
The data includes a total of 145 observations covering the United States, Japan, Australia, Singapore, and India, with the coverage of 1992-2020. Detailed summary statistics are presented below. (Figueres are in current US billion dollars.) The data source for military expenditure is the SIPRI Yearbook. For economic factors, the data is from the World Bank.

Appendix II: Model for Military Expenditure
The equation is specified as follows:

Where:
x_(1it-1) is the GDP in country i at time (t-1)
x_(2it-1) is imports of goods and services in country i at time (t-1)
x_(3it-1) is exports of goods and services in country i at time (t-1)
x_(4it-1) is China’s military expenditure at time (t-1)
And αi,β1,β2,β3,β4 are unknown parameters to be estimated.

Appendix III– Multivariate Regression on Japan’s Military Expenditure
The same model of Appendix II is used to analyze Japan’s military expenditure as follows:

*Despite the logic of the security dilemma, China’s military expenditure does not have a statistically significant impact on Japan’s military expenditure.

Appendix IV-Multivariate Regression on Japan’s Military Expenditure based on Economic Factors.
The equation is specified as follows

Where:
x_(1it-1) is the GDP in country i at time (t-1)
x_(2it-1) is imports of goods and services in country i at time (t-1)
x_(3it-1) is exports of goods and services in country i at time (t-1)

 
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