Collection of links: Philosophers who preceded “A Process Model” — with a focus on the philosophical background of the first half of the 20th century

Difficulty in accessing previous studies

At the end of his doctoral dissertation on Gendlin’s theory of metaphor, Shimpei Okamura discusses the problem involved in studying Gendlin’s writings as follows:

Because of his style of developing his own logic without clearly referencing his sources, it is often difficult to access the previous studies that formed the basis of Gendlin’s ideas and to read his work with a background understanding. (Okamura, 2018, p. 164)

This problem is applicable to more than just reading Gendlin's psychotherapeutic writings but also applies to reading his philosophical writings.

Therefore, I have written comparative studies to make it easier to access the previous studies that inspired “A Process Model (APM)” (Gendlin, 1997/2018).

Preceding philosophers in the first half of the 20th century

However, I am not competent enough to deal with the entire history of Western philosophy, which began in ancient Greece.

Therefore, I have decided to focus my discussion on the influence on APM of the writings of philosophers active in the first half of the 20th century. The philosophers and thinkers to whom I will mainly refer are as follows:

・ Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911)
・ Henri Bergson (1859–1941)
・ John Dewey (1859–1952)
・ George Herbert Mead (1863–1931)
・ I. A. Richards (1893–1979)
・ Susanne Langer (1895–1985)
・ Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961)
・ Max Black (1909–1988)

Links: Correspondence between the chapters of “A Process Model” and my discussions

I have organized the blog posts I have written so far on the background of Eugene Gendlin’s philosophy and created a list of links with an abstract of each post, indicating which chapter of APM it corresponds to:

“Chapter II: Functional Cycle (Fucy)” & “Chapter I: Body-Environment (B-En)”

• History of chapters II and I use of the term “implying” in “A Process Model”: with reference to Mead and Dewey.
  Abstract: In “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018), the basic term “implying” is used frequently. This term was first used in his earlier published papers (Gendlin, 1973a; 1973b). It is my view at this stage that the various uses of “implying” developed along the following historical lines: First, in the early 1970s, Gendlin began the “bringing or generating time” use of implying corresponding to Chapter II of APM. Next, in the late 1980s, he started the “horizontal” use of implying corresponding to Chapter I of “A Process Model” (APM). Finally, the other uses of implying were formulated with the writing of APM.

“Chapter IV-A: A Different Concept of the Body, Not a Machine” & “Chapter IV-B: Time: En#2 and En#3, Occurring and Implying”

• Gendlin’s “interaction first” and Dewey’s “transaction”.
  Abstract: While Gendlin used the term “interaction” in many of his writings, he used the term “interaction first” in “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018). I outlined some historical background of why he felt that “interaction” alone did not sufficiently convey what he meant and that it was necessary to add “first.”

• Gendlin’s position against the “idealized observer” and Dewey’s position against the “spectator”: based on their views of old and new physics.
  Abstract: Gendlin called the characteristics of living processes common to plants, animals, and humans a “non-Laplacian sequence.” So what exactly is “Laplacian”? He critically examined an assumption implicit in classical physics from Newton to Laplace. This assumption implied determinism that scientists could perfectly predict the future. It also implied that when such scientists, called the “idealized observers,” observed natural phenomena, they pretended to be non-participants, even though they were participants.

• Gendlin’s position against the “unit model” or the “content paradigm”: retroactive time in terms of G. H. Mead’s theory of time.
  Abstract: Gendlin’s idea that living processes cannot be predicted in advance leads to another important idea: the past is reviewed “ex post facto” from the present perspective. However, we tend to fall prey to the illusion that elements that should have been discovered later existed unchanged beforehand. This illusion was represented by his terms “unit model” or “content paradigm.”

• Retroactive time: Bergson as a precursor of Gendlin.
  Abstract: In both his psychotherapeutic and philosophical writings, Gendlin discussed a unique theory of time: “how our present living can change the past.” In this post, I will focus on Henri Bergson’s theory of time as a precursor to the theory. By referring to Bergson’s theory, I will not only understand Gendlin’s philosophical writings but also reconsider his own psychotherapeutic research study that led him to advocate Focusing, in relation to his senior researcher’s study (Bergman, 1951) in Carl Rogers’ group.

• Gendlin’s “focaling” and Dilthey’s “purposiveness”.
  Abstract: In “A Process Model” (APM), Gendlin wrote that a living process is “different from both arbitrariness and logic” (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 47). One of the terms for not being arbitrary is “focaling,” while one of the terms for not being logical is “non-Laplacian sequence.” “Focaling” means that the living process does not just go in any direction it wants but has a specific direction.

• Gendlin’s most important idea.
  Abstract: The most important idea common to Gendlin’s new and old philosophical masterpieces, “A Process Model” and “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning,” is “Neither arbitrary nor logical.” I tried to trace this back to Dilthey’s writings and connect the ideas. In addition, I discussed how the ideas were applied and developed in “A Process Model.”

• Gendlin’s “reversal” and the history of metaphor theories—Richards, Black, and Merleau-Ponty.
  Abstract: In his paper on the theory and practice of Focusing, Akira Ikemi discussed the order in which a metaphorical expression and the similarities, likenesses, or commonalities between the things being compared within the expression are presented as follows: “In contrast to conventional theories of metaphor where the similarity of the situation and the metaphor is assumed to be primary, in Gendlin’s metaphor theory, the similarity is found after the carrying forward” (Ikemi, 2017, p. 168). Why did Gendlin insist on this order? I will begin my discussion by examining its historical background.

“Chapter V-A: Intervening Events” & “Chapter I: Body-Environment (B-En)”

• Pragmatistic origins of Gendlin’s en#0: with reference to Dewey and Mead.
  Abstract: In “A process model,” en#0 is mentioned less often than en#2 and en#3. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that “just because it gets rarely mentioned doesn’t mean it is not structurally important.” (Jaaniste, 2021, April). There are many possible backgrounds for Gendlin’s deliberate assumption of en#0. In my view, one of the anticipations of en#0 can be found in the concept of the “natural world” that appears in John Dewey’s later work, “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.” Finally, I suggest that we can also see some points in the ideas and terminology of en#0 that are closer to G. H. Mead than to J. Dewey.

“Chapter VI-B: The Development of Behavior Space” & “Chapter III: An Object”

• A preliminary examination of the concept of “object”: from G. H. Mead to Gendlin in the 1980s.
  Abstract: In the early 1980s, Gendlin began a preliminary examination of what an “object” is to living processes. By “preliminary,” I mean that at that time, Gendlin was examining only objects for animals that had acquired perception and behavior, following George Herbert Mead. In other words, he had not yet arrived at the consideration of an “object” in Chapter III of “A Process Model (APM)” (Gendlin, 1997/2018) that also applies to unicellular organisms or plants.

“Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” & “Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage”

• Responding to a picture as a picture: Susanne Langer and Eugene Gendlin.
  Abstract: We humans, unlike animals, do not think of petting a cat in a picture. Responding to a picture as a picture is not the same as behaving as if the cat were real, as Gendlin argues in “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018). How does not behaving in the situation but processing it relates to the ability to see things as symbols—the human capacity for “aboutness”? I have explored this relationship with reference to his other philosophical paper, “Thinking beyond patterns” (Gendlin, 1991), and the work of his precursor, Susanne Langer (1895-1985), an American philosopher.

• Words and visual patterns: in light of Gendlin and Langer’s discussions.
  Abstract: In the section ‘f-9) Discursive use versus art; re-eveving versus re-recognition’ (Gendlin, 1997/2018, pp. 178-9) in ‘Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage’ of “A Process Model,” Gendlin contrasts words and visual patterns. I examined this contrast between linguistic and non-linguistic symbols by going back to the philosophy of Suzanne Langer, a previous researcher.

• Animals don’t “express” each other (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 1).
  Abstract: Gendlin’s theory of “animal gestures” has its roots in the previous studies of Charles Darwin, Wilhelm Wundt, and George Herbert Mead. In this article, I would like to focus on how Darwin’s theory of the expression of emotions was criticized by subsequent generations.

• The three-step “order” beginning with “animal gestures” (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”— Gendlin and Mead: 2).
  Abstract: In the section “c) The order” in “Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage” of “A Process Model” (APM), Gendlin briefly describes the three-step order from animal gestures to the primitive language called “protolanguage.” In APM, he also refers to Mead when discussing the second step, but as far as I can tell from actually reading Mead’s work, the second step does not seem to be discussed in much detail. Rather, in Mead’s writings, it seems that the contrast between the first and third steps is discussed more centrally, skipping the second step, in terms of “the order” by Gendlin.

• “Gestures” do not exist without the other animal (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”: Gendlin and Mead: 3).
  Abstract: For both Gendlin and Mead, “animal gestures” such as “body looks, sounds, and moves” are gestures that are only possible when the other animal responds to them. Moving their arms and legs in the same way without the other animal cannot be called “animal gestures” in the sense that they later evolve into human language.

• Fighting does not occur in a “truncated act” (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 4).
  Abstract: When Gendlin uses the example of a “threat gesture” and says, “Fighting is focally implied, but fighting is not occurring” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” this would correspond to what Mead calls a “truncated act.” This “not fighting” is thought to be related to the concept of "pause. I have discussed how “pause” is related to the capacity for "aboutness" not only in relation to Mead but also in relation to Langer.

• How we know what our bodies look like (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 5).
  Abstract: In the section “c) Representation” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” Gendlin discusses the difficult question of “how I can know what my body looks like” in the context of discussing “empathy” and argues that G. H. Mead reversed the conventional order.

• Self-consciousness emerging from gestural communication (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 6).
  Abstract: In the section “f) The new kind of CF” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” “self-consciousness” is discussed for the first time. However, the discussion is abrupt, and it may be difficult for the reader to immediately connect the discussion of gestures and the discussion of self-consciousness just by reading this section. If we go back to the discussion by Mead that Gendlin seems to have referred to, it is easier to understand that the evolution of gestures and the emergence of self-consciousness are related.

References

Gendlin, E.T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Okamura, S. (2018). Studies on the functions of crossing in Focusing (in Japanese). Doctoral Dissertation, Kansai University.

“A Process Model” and related writings
Written and compiled by Hideo TANAKA, Ph.D.
Focusing Professional - Hideo Tanaka | International Focusing Institute
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