Collection of links: North American Philosophical Roots of “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018)

Three North American philosophers who preceded Gendlin

In “A Process Model (APM)” (Gendlin, 1997/2018), various philosophers who preceded Gendlin are mentioned, either directly or indirectly. In ancient philosophy, Plato and Aristotle are mentioned, as well as Leibniz, who proposed the concept of “monads” in modern times and later, and Kant, although his reference is limited to “The Critique of Pure Reason.” Regarding influence, other names that might be mentioned are Bergson and Whitehead. However, as yet, little secondary literature on these philosophers discusses their relationships of influence thematically worldwide.

Thus, as a beginning to situate Gendlin’s philosophy historically, I have taken the philosophies of three philosophers active in the United States in the first half of the 20th century: John Dewey (1859-1952), George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), and Suzanne Langer (1895-1985). I have discussed their philosophies and introduced them as precursors to APM in my previous blog posts.

Dewey and Mead are important figures in the school of “classical pragmatism” in the history of philosophy. The two were colleagues at the University of Chicago and allies from then on. Dewey’s philosophy includes works that thematically discuss “the interaction of organisms with their environment.” Two of these are “Experience and Nature” (Dewey, 1925/1929) and “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry” (Dewey, 1938). I see these as strongly influencing Chapters I-IV of APM. I have also drawn on his complementary works “The Quest for Certainty” (Dewey, 1929) and “Knowing and the Known” (Dewey & Bentley, 1949). Like Dewey, Mead was concerned with “the interaction of organisms with their environment. I also see his theory of time (Mead, 1932) as influencing Chapter IV-B, “Time,” in APM, and his theory of symbols (Mead, 1934) as influencing Chapter VII, “Culture, Symbol, and Language,” in APM. It should be noted that there are previous studies by the Swiss philosopher Donata Schoeller (Schoeller & Dunaetz, 2018; Saller & Schoeller, 2018) on the influence of Dewey and Mead on Gendlin.

Langer’s philosophy, on the other hand, is a continuation of “The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms” (Cassirer, 1923-9) of Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), who emigrated from Germany to the United States. The aesthetics she developed is generally seen as a counterpoint to Dewey’s pragmatist aesthetics. However, her philosophy has strongly influenced APM, although Gendlin does not explicitly mention it. In particular, I see her philosophy as having a strong influence on “to respond a picture as a picture,” “aboutness,” and “discursive use versus art” of symbols discussed in Chapter VII of APM. In my blog posts, I focus on Langer’s major work, “Philosophy in a New Key” (Langer, 1942/1957).

Collection of links to my blog posts

Below, I will provide links to the chapters of APM that correspond to each of my previous blog posts.

“Chapter II: Functional Cycle (Fucy)” & “Chapter I: Body-Environment (B-En)”

• History of chapters II and I use of the term “implying” in “A Process Model”: with reference to Mead and Dewey.
  Abstract: In “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018), the basic term “implying” is used frequently. This term was first used in his earlier published papers (Gendlin, 1973a; 1973b). It is my view at this stage that the various uses of “implying” developed along the following historical lines: First, in the early 1970s, Gendlin began the “bringing or generating time” use of implying corresponding to Chapter II of APM. Next, in the late 1980s, he started the “horizontal” use of implying corresponding to Chapter I of “A Process Model” (APM). Finally, the other uses of implying were formulated with the writing of APM.

“Chapter IV-A: A Different Concept of the Body, Not a Machine”

• Gendlin’s “interaction first” and Dewey’s “transaction”.
  Abstract: While Gendlin used the term “interaction” in many of his writings, he used the term “interaction first” in “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018). I outlined some historical background of why he felt that “interaction” alone did not sufficiently convey what he meant and that it was necessary to add “first.”

• Gendlin’s position against the “idealized observer” and Dewey’s position against the “spectator”: based on their views of old and new physics.
  Abstract: Gendlin called the characteristics of living processes common to plants, animals, and humans a “non-Laplacian sequence.” So what exactly is “Laplacian”? He critically examined an assumption implicit in classical physics from Newton to Laplace. This assumption implied determinism that scientists could perfectly predict the future. It also implied that when such scientists, called the “idealized observers,” observed natural phenomena, they pretended to be non-participants, even though they were participants.

• Gendlin’s position against the “unit model” or the “content paradigm”: retroactive time in terms of G. H. Mead’s theory of time.
  Abstract: Gendlin’s idea that living processes cannot be predicted in advance leads to another important idea: the past is reviewed “ex post facto” from the present perspective. However, we tend to fall prey to the illusion that elements that should have been discovered later existed unchanged beforehand. This illusion was represented by his terms “unit model” or “content paradigm.”

“Chapter V-A: Intervening Events” & “Chapter I: Body-Environment (B-En)”

• Pragmatistic origins of Gendlin’s en#0: with reference to Dewey and Mead.
  Abstract: In “A process model,” en#0 is mentioned less often than en#2 and en#3. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that “just because it gets rarely mentioned doesn’t mean it is not structurally important.” (Jaaniste, 2021, April). There are many possible backgrounds for Gendlin’s deliberate assumption of en#0. In my view, one of the anticipations of en#0 can be found in the concept of the “natural world” that appears in John Dewey’s later work, “Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.” Finally, I suggest that we can also see some points in the ideas and terminology of en#0 that are closer to G. H. Mead than to J. Dewey.

“Chapter VI-B: The Development of Behavior Space” & “Chapter III: An Object”

• A preliminary examination of the concept of “object”: from G. H. Mead to Gendlin in the 1980s.
  Abstract: In the early 1980s, Gendlin began a preliminary examination of what an “object” is to living processes. By “preliminary,” I mean that at that time, Gendlin was examining only objects for animals that had acquired perception and behavior, following George Herbert Mead. In other words, he had not yet arrived at the consideration of an “object” in Chapter III of “A Process Model (APM)” (Gendlin, 1997/2018) that also applies to unicellular organisms or plants.

“Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” & “Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage”

• Responding to a picture as a picture: Susanne Langer and Eugene Gendlin.
  Abstract: We humans, unlike animals, do not think of petting a cat in a picture. Responding to a picture as a picture is not the same as behaving as if the cat were real, as Gendlin argues in “A Process Model” (Gendlin, 1997/2018). How does not behaving in the situation but processing it relates to the ability to see things as symbols—the human capacity for “aboutness”? I have explored this relationship with reference to his other philosophical paper, “Thinking beyond patterns” (Gendlin, 1991), and the work of his precursor, Susanne Langer (1895-1985), an American philosopher.

• Words and visual patterns: in light of Gendlin and Langer’s discussions.
  Abstract: In the section ‘f-9) Discursive use versus art; re-eveving versus re-recognition’ (Gendlin, 1997/2018, pp. 178-9) in ‘Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage’ of “A Process Model,” Gendlin contrasts words and visual patterns. I examined this contrast between linguistic and non-linguistic symbols by going back to the philosophy of Suzanne Langer, a previous researcher.

• Animals don’t “express” each other (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 1).
  Abstract: Gendlin’s theory of “animal gestures” has its roots in the previous studies of Charles Darwin, Wilhelm Wundt, and George Herbert Mead. In this article, I would like to focus on how Darwin’s theory of the expression of emotions was criticized by subsequent generations.

• The three-step “order” beginning with “animal gestures” (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”— Gendlin and Mead: 2).
  Abstract: In the section “c) The order” in “Chapter VII-B: Protolanguage” of “A Process Model” (APM), Gendlin briefly describes the three-step order from animal gestures to the primitive language called “protolanguage.” In APM, he also refers to Mead when discussing the second step, but as far as I can tell from actually reading Mead’s work, the second step does not seem to be discussed in much detail. Rather, in Mead’s writings, it seems that the contrast between the first and third steps is discussed more centrally, skipping the second step, in terms of “the order” by Gendlin.

• “Gestures” do not exist without the other animal (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”: Gendlin and Mead: 3).
  Abstract: For both Gendlin and Mead, “animal gestures” such as “body looks, sounds, and moves” are gestures that are only possible when the other animal responds to them. Moving their arms and legs in the same way without the other animal cannot be called “animal gestures” in the sense that they later evolve into human language.

• Fighting does not occur in a “truncated act” (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 4).
  Abstract: When Gendlin uses the example of a “threat gesture” and says, “Fighting is focally implied, but fighting is not occurring” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” this would correspond to what Mead calls a “truncated act.” This “not fighting” is thought to be related to the concept of "pause. I have discussed how “pause” is related to the capacity for "aboutness" not only in relation to Mead but also in relation to Langer.

• How we know what our bodies look like (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 5).
  Abstract: In the section “c) Representation” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” Gendlin discusses the difficult question of “how I can know what my body looks like” in the context of discussing “empathy” and argues that G. H. Mead reversed the conventional order.

• Self-consciousness emerging from gestural communication (Symbolic process beginning with “animal gestures”—Gendlin and Mead: 6).
  Abstract: In the section “f) The new kind of CF” in “Chapter VII-A: Symbolic Process” of “A Process Model,” “self-consciousness” is discussed for the first time. However, the discussion is abrupt, and it may be difficult for the reader to immediately connect the discussion of gestures and the discussion of self-consciousness just by reading this section. If we go back to the discussion by Mead that Gendlin seems to have referred to, it is easier to understand that the evolution of gestures and the emergence of self-consciousness are related.

References

Cassirer, E. (1923-9). Philosophie der symbolischen Formen. Bruno Cassirer.

Dewey, J. (1929). Experience and nature (2nd ed.). Open Court.

Dewey, J. (1929). The quest for certainty. Minton, Balch.

Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: the theory of inquiry. Henry Holt.

Dewey, J. & Bentley, A.F. (1949). Knowing and the known. Beacon Press.

Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Kant (1787). Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2nd ed.). Johann Friedrich Hartknoch.

Langer, S.K. (1942/1957). Philosophy in a new key: a study in the symbolism of reason, rite, and art (3rd ed.). Harvard University Press.

Mead, G.H. (1932). The philosophy of the present (edited by A.E. Murphy). Open Court.

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society: from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. (edited by C.W. Morris). University of Chicago Press.

Saller, V. & Schoeller, D. (2018). Cognition as a Transformative Process, European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, 10(1), 12–1.

Schoeller, D. & Dunaetz, N. (2018). Thinking emergence as interaffecting: approaching and contextualizing Eugene Gendlin’s Process Model. Continental Philosophy Review, 51, 123–140.