反间谍！定义的空缺、定义的权力和溢出自身的大他者

     关于最近通过的反间谍法，我想我们需要想起几个过去不同时期发生的事情：一个是反右，一个是斯大林集体化时期的反富农 （kulak），一个是纳粹时期的反犹太人。
     在这几个不同时期的事件中我们可以看到三个东西，一个是概念的定义的空缺、一个是权力机器掌握着对于概念的定义的权力，一个是人民被提供了一种溢出他自身的大他者来推动“定义”这个行为以服务权力机器的目的。这几个事件里的概念，除了纳粹时期的犹太人的身份已经被进行了固定，其他的概念都是空洞的、空白的（“犹太人”作为一种确定的民族身份，而“右派”没有任何确定的意义），这些概念不需要一个明确的解释，不需要一个实在的定义，而正是这样的空缺覆盖了权力机器拥有的定义的权力。只要能达到目的，任何人都可以被回溯性地被绑定在“概念”之上，所以可能只要你做出反对权力机器的事情，危害到权力机器的正当性的事情，就随时都可能被定义为“右派”，被定义为“次级富农”，当然在当下，被定义为“间谍”。

     我们可以来看看齐泽克在Mao Zedong: the Marxist Lord of Misrule 里所写的关于斯大林集体化时期的富农的内容：

We find the same procedure in the classificatory impasse the Stalinist ideologists and political activists faced in their struggle for collectivization in the years 1928-1933. In their attempt to account for their effort to crush the peasants' resistance in "scientific" Marxist terms, they divided peasants into three categories (classes): the poor peasants (no land or minimal land, working for others), natural allies of the workers; the autonomous middle peasants, oscillating between the exploited and exploiters; the rich peasants, "kulaks" (employing other workers, lending them money or seeds, etc.), the exploiting "class enemy" which, as such, has to be "liquidated." However, in practice, this classification became more and more blurred and inoperative: in the generalized poverty, clear criteria no longer applied, and other two categories often joined kulaks in their resistance to forced collectivization. An additional category was thus introduced, that of a subkulak, a peasant who, although, with regard to his economic situation, was to poor to be considered a kulak proper, nonetheless shared the kulak "counter-revolutionary" attitude. Subkulak was thus a term without any real social content even by Stalinist standards, but merely rather unconvincingly masquerading as such. As was officially stated, 'by kulak we mean the carrier of certain political tendencies which are most frequently discernible in the subkulak, male and female.' By this means, any peasant whatever was liable to dekulakisation; and the subkulak notion was widely employed, enlarging the category of victims greatly beyond the official estimate of kulaks proper even at its most strained
……
The art of identifying a kulak was thus no longer a matter of objective social analysis; it became the matter of a complex "hermeneutics of suspicion," of identifying one's "true political attitudes" hidden beneath deceiving public proclamations, so that Pravda had to concede that "even the best activists often cannot spot the kulak." [16]

What all this points towards is the dialectical mediation of the "subjective" and "objective" dimension: subkulak no longer designates an "objective" social category; it designates the point at which objective social analysis breaks down and subjective political attitude directly inscribes itself into the "objective" order - in Lacanese, subkulak is the point of subjectivization of the "objective" chain poor peasant - middle peasant - kulak. It is not an "objective" sub-category (or sub-division) of the class of kulaks, but simply the name for the kulak subjective political attitude - this accounts for the paradox that, although it appears as a subdivision of the class of kulaks, subkulaks is a species that overflows its own genus (that of kulaks), since subkulaks are also to be found among middle and even poor farmers. In short, subkulak names political division as such, the Enemy whose presence traverses the ENTIRE social body of peasants, which is why he can be found everywhere, in all three peasant classes. This brings us back to the procedure of Stalinist dieresis: subkulak names the excessive element that traverses all classes, the outgrowth which has to be eliminated.

     在这里我们看到的，不就是一个空洞的概念次级富农subkulak？当贫穷的普通农民和富有的拥有“反革命态度”的富农之间出现了混淆的时候，这个难以被解释清楚的概念出现了。在整个反富农的行动中，次级富农这个概念的出现把一种“客观的”（“客观”并不是这是一种“事实”，只是说证明的因素是外在的）社会类别的定义转向了对“主观的”政治态度的挖掘。然而这个概念本身不具有任何明确的定义，没有任何外在的社会内容可以证明一个农民是否是次级富农，而依据却变为了一种内在的“反革命态度”。当然，作为次级富农这个概念的依据的“反革命态度”本身也是空洞的，任何反对权力机器的态度都可能被归为“反革命态度”的类别，主体本身也就可以在任何情况下被归为次级富农的类别。就像齐泽克在这里所说，对于富农的定义变成了一种“怀疑的解释论”（hermeneutics of suspicion），任何主体都可以成为被怀疑的、归于被打击的类别中的对象。在这个过程中，定义总是处于一种缺失的状态，即使是最好的积极分子都常常无法找出富农，被定义在这个概念上的对象甚至在最牵强的意义上超出了官方的判断。更准确地说，这个概念从一开始根本就不需要被固定，也无法被“最好的积极分子”和官方准确判断，因为它本身就是一个保持着一无所有的空缺，或者用在反右中出现的例子，如果在反瞒产运动中说没有粮食就可能被扣上“反右”的帽子（见YJS 木杯 第一章 ）。也只有在这样的运动作为前提的语境下，“说没有粮食”才能和“反右”产生联系，成为被定义的原因。我们甚至不难想象，在当下你可能因为“非常博学”被定义为间谍，也可能因为太过于“表面人畜无害”被定义为间谍，可能因为表达的太多被定义为“间谍”，也可能因为一声不吭被定义为“间谍。”
这样我们就看到了另一样东西，即使苏联集体化时期的积极分子、官方自己甚至都难以给出一个明确的定义，即使“右派”的内容在不断改变，这里稳固的、没有被移动的是权力机器掌握着对定义的权力。就像在纳粹的官方宣传下，一种不洁的、对宗教规则教条式遵守的、邪恶金融投机的、潜在国际影响的犹太人的形象被塑造起来，当然掌握着塑造这种形象的权力的也是纳粹的权力机器（Anti-Semitism and Intersectionality
May 29, 2023 SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK：……By the same token, the anti-Semitic idea of the "Tew" combines features of religion, ethnicity, sexuality, education, wealth, and physical appearance. To be stigmatized as a Jew entails the ascription of various other features, such as uncleanliness, dogmatic adherence to religious rules, nefarious financial speculation, and hidden global influence - all of which featured prominently in Nazi propaganda……）。正是这样的权力让权力机器可以为了某种目的而去根据情况决定概念的内容，他们掌握着“名称”，掌握着形式，掌握着能指。所以当我们去怀疑我们的邻居或者亲人是否是间谍的时候，我们应该提问：是谁在提出这个概念？是谁在提供语境？

     当然，掌握着定义的权力是不够的，我们可以在体验这种语境的主体中看到另一个东西。在反右、富农、犹太人、反间谍中存在着这样一种特征：他们总不像表面那样，有一种内在的“邪恶“需要被挖掘。换句话说，对于一个相信着官方意识形态的主体来说，被怀疑的他者总是具有一种神秘的内在性质，而这种性质“溢出”了他表面所展示的可爱形象。这种他者在刚才提到的齐泽克所说的“怀疑的阐释论”中起到了重要的作用。什么样的人值得怀疑？当然是我么身边的普通的、“人畜无害的”隐藏着他们“邪恶”内在的人。我们在这里需要关注的，是对这种“表面“和“内在”的存在的相信，对于潜在的性质的相信，也就是主体已经进入了官方提供的意识形态的场域中时产生症状。重点并不是是否真的存在着证据能够证明那个人是个间谍，而是你已经相信存在着一种隐瞒着自己的“内在”的他者，总有一些人想要否定党的路线，总有一些人抱着反革命态度，犹太人总隐藏着一些阴谋。或者说总有一些人想要把我们国家的机密泄露给美国，你只需要去找到特征来将那个对象回溯地绑定在作为能指的“间谍”之上。这样一来，权力机器便可以制造足够多服务于他们的政治目的的怀疑的主体，而作为维持“怀疑的主体”的主体位置的大他者的被绑定在某个概念上的主体无论怎样都无法证明自己的清白。