McKeon’s “Reflexive Principles” & Gendlin’s “Reflexivity”

When Gendlin was a graduate student at the University of Chicago, one of his philosophy teachers was Richard McKeon (1900–1985). The “reflexive principles” in “Philosophic Semantics” (McKeon, 1951; 1963/1994; 1966/1990; Watson; 1985) that McKeon originated and the “reflexivity” in chapter V of “Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (ECM)” (Gendlin, 1958; 1962/1997) are correlated:

What's the second possibility? Well, the second possibility would appear in what I like to call reflexive principles. We'll now take our beginning not from a universe which is intelligible in its very essence, that is, a built-in intelligibility where the universe itself does its thinking; we'll take it, rather, in terms of what we know. In our own bodies of knowledge it is frequently the case that what we are saying is an instance of itself, and when that occurs we have a reflexive principle. (McKeon, 1963/1994, p. 77; bold added)

Reflexive principles are holoscopic in that they resolve problems into a plurality of wholes formed by principles which are reflexively instances of themselves. (McKeon, 1966/1990, p. 246; bold added)

... reflexive principles seek a plurality of subject matters which are marked off by instances of knowledge which is self-instantiating and by beings which are self-caused or first causes. (McKeon, 1966/1990, p. 250; bold added)

Here then we have an experiential version of the reflexive definition of “meaning” as (a faculty of) experiencing considered as an instance of itself (turning or reflecting on itself). (Gendlin, 1958, p. 168; 1962/1997, p. 186; bold added)

The term “reflexivity” refers to any case where something is an instance of itself. (Gendlin, 1958, p. 186; 1962/1997, p. 202; bold added)

McKeon proposed the “reflexive principles” (McKeon, 1951) before Gendlin wrote his doctoral dissertation (Gendlin, 1958), the original ECM (Gendlin, 1962/1997):

Reflexive principles are sought by analyzing a problem or a subject into a whole sufficiently homogeneous and independent to permit solution of the problem or statement of the subject. Reflexive principles make such a formulation possible and verifiable by affording knowledge of the form of knowledge required, by indicating actions affecting the action in question, by providing analyses of the processes of analysis, or by undertaking inquiry into the modes of inquiry. (McKeon, 1951, p. 667; bold added)

However, I have yet to find any evidence that McKeon used the terms “instance,” “instancing,” or “instantiating” in the context of discussing the reflexive principles at any time before 1958.

In any case, it can be said that both McKeon and Gendlin place great emphasis on Aristotle when discussing the term “reflexive”:

Reflexive principles appear ... in their purest and perhaps most explicit form in the philosophy of Aristotle, for the major parts of his philosophy are organized and the interrelations among them are determined by reflexive principles: metaphysics, which is the science of first principles, finds its basic principle in God, the unmoved mover, whose characteristic activity is thinking about thinking; in psychology actual knowledge is identical in human thought with its object, and the soul is in a way all existing things; the bases of politics are laid in the definition of the citizen by his functions of ruling and being ruled; the end of morals is happiness which is found in contemplation since that is most nearly akin to the activity of God; and art is an imitation of action and character. (McKeon, 1951, p. 668; bold added)

About the first principle of the universe, Aristotle says that its "thought thinks itself ... " (Metaphysics 1072b). This thinking does not think nor act directly on anything. It thinks only its thinking. (Gendlin, 1991/1995, p. 151; bold added)

Currently many philosophers say that we cannot catch our thinking; we think always only the resulting object. Aristotle says on the contrary, that ongoing thinking ("knowledge in act") always catches itself; it is always an object to itself…. Knowledge (episteme) in act (energeian) is identical (auto) with its object (pragmati).” (Anima III-6, 430b30 - III-7, 431a1) (Gendlin, 1991/1995, p. 138; bold added)

Knowledge-in-act is the same as (“auto”) its thing. The medieval scholars called this identity “reflexive.” The activity and the thing are one because the activity “turns on itself” and takes itself as its thing. (We don't have this in English.) The activity is an existing self-knowing. (Gendlin, 2004/2012, III-5, p. 6; bold added)

One way in which a perception is more than being affected is sensing that we sense. And this is not sensed by another sense but is always inherent in the sensing. We would not see red if we didn’t also see that we see red. Notice this characteristic pattern: not two, not one observing the other. Aristotle argues that the single activity inherently includes the object and the turn on itself. We can specify what Aristotle means if we first try to argue that a machine could sense “that it senses.” For example, the elevator door can emit a warning sound when it “senses” someone in the way. One might argue that it does not only sense someone; it also indicates that it senses. But it indicates this – to whom? Not to itself. In contrast, “sensing that we sense” is what I would call “self-indicating.” The old tradition called it “reflexivity.” Sometimes people call it “recursive.” (For an excellent discussion of reflexive principles, see Walter Watson.) When “we sense that we sense,” it is not a sign to others. Sensing is a process to itself. I think he means something similar about noein. Once we have sense and images, Aristotle takes nous to be an additional turn that is again a turn to itself. (Gendlin, 2004/2012, Endnotes, p. 63; bold added)

My personal view at this stage is that Gendlin’s use of the terms “turn” or “turning” in interpreting Aristotle’s text may have been influenced by Neoplatonism. Please refer to the sequel blog post, “Thomas Aquinas, McKeon, & Gendlin.”

References

Gendlin, E.T. (1958). The Function of Experiencing in Symbolization. Doctoral dissertation. University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy.

Gendlin, E.T. (1962/1997). Experiencing and the creation of meaning: a philosophical and psychological approach to the subjective (Paper ed.). Northwestern University Press.

Gendlin, E.T. (1991/1995). Ultimacy in Aristotle: in essence activity. In N. Georgopoulos & M. Heim (Eds.) Being human in the ultimate: studies in the thought of John M. Anderson (pp. 135–66). Rodopi.

Gendlin, E.T. (2004/2012). Line by line commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima Book III. The Focusing Institute.

McKeon, R.P. (1951). Philosophy and Method. The Journal of Philosophy, 48(22), 653–82.

McKeon, R.P. (1963/1994). On knowing: the natural sciences (edited by D.B. Owen and Z.K. McKeon). University of Chicago Press.

McKeon, R.P. (1966/1990). Philosophic semantics and philosophic inquiry. In Freedom and history and other essays: an introduction to the thought of Richard McKeon (edited by Z.K. McKeon) (pp. 242–55). University of Chicago Press.

Watson, W. (1985/1993). The architectonics of meaning: foundations of the new pluralism. University of Chicago Press.