ハーバード見聞録(74)
「ハーバード見聞録」のいわれ
「ハーバード見聞録」は、自衛隊退官直後の2005年から07年までの間のハーバード大学アジアセンター上級客員研究員時代に書いたものである。
前回に引き続き、「中国の核ドミノ戦略」を紹介する。
第2回―「中国の核ドミノ戦略」の英語要訳版(6月11日の稿)
本稿は、「中国の核ドミノ戦略」を要約したものを筆者の拙い英語能力で英訳し、ワシントンポストに投稿したものである。本メルマガの読者の中には欧米などの方々がおられ、読んでいただけることを期待している。
「中国の核ドミノ戦略」でお示しした筆者の「未来予測」は2022年の時点でいよいよその信憑性が高まっているものと自負している。「中国の核ドミノ戦略」により、日米・米韓分断などにより、北東アジア情勢は中国の描くシナリオ通りに、ドラスティックに変わる可能性が出てきた。
さて、アメリカよ、貴国はどう対処するのか。北朝鮮は際限のない核開発を続けている。今から15年以上も前(ハーバード遊学時代)にお知らせし、貴国の情報関係者は私の論文を読んでいたはずなのに。
China's Nuclear Domino Strategy——China's Strategy to separate Japan, the United States, and South Korea
Flags of Our Fathers, the recent movie directed by Clint Eastwood, depicts the fierce World War II battle on the island of Iwo Jima. By the end of the battle, there were nearly 7,000 dead Americans and over 21,000 dead Japanese. World War II underscored to the American people Japan’s military potential and the costs of U.S.-Japan conflict. On the other hand, the Japanese people learned the price to Japan of challenging U.S. security interests in East Asia. Since World War II, both Washington and Tokyo have learned the value of the Japan-US alliance to regional peace and stability and to each country’s prosperity. But in the not-so-distant future, the Japan-US alliance might be threatened by the rising China.
Beijing is currently using the Korean Peninsula “ six-party talks”to expand its influence in Northeast Asia. China will not be able to develop military power to rival the United States until 2030. Until then, it will seek to avoid U.S.-China conflict. But once China develops military parity with the United States, it will likely challenge the security alliances between the United States and Asian countries. It will use its military power to pressure local countries to distance themselves from the United States. Beijing’s ultimate objective will be to separate Japan from the United States.
Proliferation of nuclear weapons to North Korea will lead to falling “Nuclear Dominoes” in Northeast Asia and contribute to the growth of Chinese regional influence. First North Korea, then South Korea, and finally Japan will develop nuclear weapons. And Japanese development of nuclear weapons could trigger Japan’s leftist movement and anti-American nationalism. This will contribute to U.S.-Japan estrangement, the erosion of U.S.-led regional alliances, and to Chinese regional leadership.
Although China might not welcome nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula or in Japan, its primary interest is driving the United States off of the Chinese perimeter. This requires dividing the United States and Japan.. This contributes to Beijing’s reluctance to put sufficient pressure on North Korea to end its nuclear program.
Nuclearization of Northeast Asia would damage U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait. The fall of Northeast Asian “nuclear dominoes” would lead to U.S. loss of its strategic bases in Northeast Asia. In these circumstances, it would be very difficult for the U.S. to intervene in a Taiwan crisis, so that Taiwan would have no choice but to fall into China’s orbit. For Beijing, the “Nuclear Domino Strategy” is less costly and preferable than using military force to compel Taiwan unification. We should note of that Sun Tzu, China’s most famous strategist, advised that the best policy is one that does not require military force.
During the leadership of President Pak , South Korea tried to develop nuclear weapons. The United States, however, pressured Seoul to end its effort, threatening to withdraw its forces from South Korea. Now the purpose of South Korean nuclear armament would be to balance the developing nuclear power of North Korea and, after unification, to enable Seoul to take the initiative and maintain independence from the U.S., China and Russia.
The U.S. is planning to reduce 12,500 personnel from Korea and return the authority of wartime operational control over South Korean forces. U.S. forces in South Korea have functioned as “a cap of the bottle” and enabled Washington to block South Korean development of nuclear weapons. But in the future, the U.S. may not be able to control South Korea’s nuclear ambitions. South Korea has been made remarkable progress in developing cruise missiles that could be a platform for nuclear weapons. South Korea’s refusal to support Washington’s Proliferation Security Initiative suggests that it may once again be considering development of nuclear weapons.
South Korean nuclear armament could extend the “Nuclear Domino” to Japan, ultimately contributing to the disintegration of Japan-US relationship. Moreover, it would coincide with the revision of the Japanese constitution, which could similarly trigger a review of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Americans and Japanese must remember that the Japanese “peace constitution” has been the foundation of U.S.-Japan cooperation and of Japan’s “Yoshida Doctrine,” the origins of Japan’s post-World War II grand strategy. Revision of the Japanese constitution is closely related to reforms of Japanese diplomacy and defense policy.
The fall of Northeast Asia’s “Nuclear Dominoes” will promote the revision of the Japanese constitution and have multiplier effect on Japanese defense policy and, thus, U.S.-Japan relations. To stop the fall of the “Nuclear Domino Strategy” and prevent the expansion of Chinese influence in Northeast Asia, it is essential for the U.S. to check North Korean nuclear development. Washington must not waiver.
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