米国商務省BIS Don't let this happen to you 発行
米国商務省BISは、不定期に「Don't let this happen to you」「あなたにこのようなことが起こらないように」を発行しています。
米国商務省BISは、3月に発行したばかりですが、7月にも発行しました。
JETROがそれに合わせてレターを発行しています。それによると今回2件追加されたとのことです。
「Don't let this happen to you」について、米国商務省BISのHPを確認したところ過去の版をいくつか入手できたので、知られている会社、日本に関係する会社などいくつかピックアップしてみました。
日常の取引審査、年1回の監査などで、
法令違反に気づいたら速やかに自己申告することが必要ですね。
米国商務省BISのEARは、日本などと比較するとよく強化されるので、
そのタイミングでしっかり判断し、後々に判断を変えなければならないようにしましょう。
過去にこうした事故を起こした日本の会社・団体は、
再発防止なども徹底されるので安心して取引できるのではないかと思います。
July 2024 Edition
Seagate Technology LLC / Seagate Singapore International Headquarters PTE. LTD.
March 2024 Editionと同じ内容。
Avnet Asia Pte. Ltd / Cheng Bo
アヴネットグループのシンガポール拠点。日本拠点アヴネット株式会社
March 2024 Editionと同じ内容。
Microsoft Corporation
March 2024 Editionと同じ内容。
Federal Express
September 2020 Editionと同じ内容。
March 2024 Edition
Seagate Technology LLC / Seagate Singapore International Headquarters PTE. LTD.
The Violation: Between 2020 and 2021, Seagate Technology LLC of Fremont, California (Seagate US) and Seagate Singapore International Headquarters PTE. LTD (Seagate Singapore) ordered or caused the reexport, from abroad, or transfer (in-country) of more than 7.4 million hard disk drives (HDDs) valued at over $1.1 billion to Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei) or other Huawei entities listed on the BIS Entity List without a license or other authorization from BIS. Huawei, whose headquarters is located in Shenzhen China, was added to the BIS Entity List in 2019, based on a determination made by multiple U.S. government agencies “that there is a reasonable cause to believe that Huawei has been involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” In August 2020, BIS issued a Foreign Direct Product Rule (the Huawei FDPR), imposing controls over the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of certain foreign-produced items to Huawei. Despite this, Seagate continued to do business with Huawei. Seagate did so despite the fact that its only two competitors had stopped selling HDDs to Huawei, resulting in Seagate becoming Huawei’s sole source provider of HDDs. Subsequently, Seagate entered into a three-year Strategic Cooperation Agreement with Huawei, naming Seagate as “Huawei’s strategic supplier” and granting the company “priority basis over other Huawei suppliers.” The HDDs are designated EAR99, but were manufactured using ECCN 3B992 tools that were the “direct product” of U.S.-origin ECCN 3E991 technology, thus subjecting them to the Huawei FDPR, meaning a license was required for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of the HDDs to Huawei. Seagate did not obtain a license for its HDD sales.
The Penalty: On April 19, 2023, BIS imposed a $300 million civil penalty as part of a settlement agreement with Seagate Technology LLC and Seagate Singapore to resolve the alleged violations. This represents the largest standalone administrative penalty in BIS history. The settlement also includes a multi-year audit requirement and a five-year suspended Denial Order.
Avnet Asia Pte. Ltd / Cheng Bo
アヴネットグループのシンガポール拠点。日本拠点アヴネット株式会社
The Violation: Avnet Asia Pte. Ltd is a Singapore company and global distributor of electronic components and related software. Former Avnet Asia Sales Account Manager Cheng Bo, aka Joe Cheng, participated in a criminal conspiracy from 2012-2015 to violate U.S. export laws by shipping power amplifiers classified under ECCN 3A001 and controlled for National Security and Anti-Terrorism reasons to China. Cheng, having established Globe Communication Limited as a false front company and end user in Hong Kong, submitted paperwork on behalf of the customer to purchase export-controlled items, including the power amplifiers. Cheng caused false statements to be made to the U.S. manufacturer of the power amplifiers stating that his customer would use them in Hong Kong when, in fact, Cheng knew the goods would be illegally shipped to China to a party linked to the Chinese military. Another former Avnet Asia employee caused U.S. goods to be shipped to China and Iran without a license in violation of the IEEPA, to include ECCN 3A001 electronic components. Avnet Asia cooperated with the U.S. government in this investigation and terminated Cheng and the other former employee because of their participation in the illegal schemes. An indictment charging Cheng with conspiracy to violate the IEEPA and money laundering was unsealed in January 2021. Cheng remains at-large. This case resulted from a joint investigation conducted by OEE’s Chicago Field Office, HSI, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The Penalty: Avnet Asia Pte. Ltd agreed in January 2021 to a global settlement with BIS and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Avnet Asia agreed to a Non-Prosecution Agreement with DOJ that included a $1.5 million fine to settle criminal liability for both the Cheng transshipments described above and the illegal export of electronic components to Iran and China through Singapore by other employees. Avnet Asia also agreed to a BIS administrative settlement of $3.2 million (with $1.5 million suspended) for the aforementioned and additional violations, including unauthorized shipments to a company appearing on the BIS Entity List.
Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE) and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications Equipment
The Violation: On March 22, 2017, Chinese companies Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation and ZTE Kangxun Telecommunications Ltd., known collectively as ZTE, pled guilty in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Texas in connection with the illegal shipment of telecommunications equipment to Iran and North Korea in violation of the EAR and the ITSR. ZTE conspired to evade the U.S. embargo against Iran in order to obtain contracts with and related sales from Iranian entities, including entities affiliated with the Iranian Government, to supply, build, operate, and/or service large-scale telecommunications networks in Iran, the backbone of which would be U.S.-origin equipment and software. As a result of the conspiracy, ZTE was able to obtain hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts with and sales from such Iranian entities. ZTE also undertook other actions involving 283 shipments of controlled items to North Korea with knowledge that such shipments violated the EAR. Shipped items included routers, microprocessors, and servers controlled under the EAR for national security, encryption, regional security, and/or anti-terrorism reasons. In addition, ZTE engaged in evasive conduct designed to prevent the U.S. Government from detecting its violations. OEE learned that in November 2013, following a meeting of senior managers chaired by its then-CEO, ZTE made plans to resume transshipments to Iran that would continue during the course of the investigation. On March 7, 2016, BIS sanctioned ZTE by adding it to the BIS Entity List, which created a license requirement to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to ZTE any items subject to the EAR. During the course of the investigation, ZTE made knowingly false and misleading representations and statements to OEE or other U.S. law enforcement agencies, including that the company had previously stopped shipments to Iran as of March 2012, and was no longer violating U.S. export control laws. ZTE also engaged in an elaborate scheme to prevent disclosure to and affirmatively mislead the U.S. Government, by deleting and concealing documents and information from the outside counsel and forensic accounting firm that ZTE had retained with regard to the investigation. Following the 2017 settlement, ZTE admitted that it had falsely informed the U.S. Government that the company would or had discipline numerous employees responsible for the violations that led to the March 2017 settlement agreement. ZTE instead rewarded that illegal activity with bonuses. This case resulted from a joint investigation conducted by OEE’s Dallas Field Office, HSI, and the FBI.
The Penalty: On March 22, 2017, ZTE agreed to a combined civil and criminal penalty of $1.19 billion, the largest fine and forfeiture ever levied by the U.S. Government in an export control case. ZTE agreed to pay a penalty of $661 million to BIS, with $300 million suspended during a seven-year probationary period. ZTE also agreed to pay OFAC $100,871,266 pursuant to a settlement agreement. In addition, ZTE agreed to active audit and compliance requirements designed to prevent and detect future violations and a seven-year suspended denial of export privileges. On April 15, 2018, BIS activated the suspended denial order against ZTE in response to the company’s admission that it had made false statements to the U.S. Government. On June 8, 2018, BIS and ZTE agreed to a superseding settlement agreement including a civil penalty of $1.4 billion, of which ZTE paid $1 billion out-of-pocket and deposited $400 million into an escrow account in a U.S. bank, where it would remain for ten years unless the company violated U.S. export controls. ZTE also agreed to a 10-year suspended denial order and the retention of a Special Compliance Coordinator, selected by BIS and paid by ZTE.
Microsoft Corporation
The Violation: On seven occasions between December 2016, and December 2017, employees of Microsoft Russia caused another Microsoft subsidiary to enter into or sell software licensing agreements that would allow the transfer or access to software subject to the EAR by FAU ‘Glavgosekspertiza Rossii’ and United Shipbuilding Corporation Joint Stock Company (“United Shipbuilding Corporation”), both of which were on the BIS Entity List. FAU ‘Glavgosekspertiza Rossii’ is a Russian federal institution involved with construction projects, including the Kerch Bridge, which was built to connect Crimea to Russia after its 2014 invasion. United Shipbuilding Corporation is responsible for developing and building the Russian Navy’s warships. In the case of FAU ‘Glavgosekspertiza Rossii’, certain Russia-based employees of Microsoft Russia ordered software licenses through one of Microsoft’s Open sales programs in the names of parties not on the BIS Entity List; in the case of United Shipbuilding, an increased number of software licenses were added under non-listed affiliates’ enterprise agreements. This case resulted from a joint investigation conducted by OEE’s Portland Resident Office and OFAC. The Penalty: On April 26, 2023, as part of a coordinated enforcement effort, BIS and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed a combined $3.3 million in civil penalties against Microsoft Corporation.
Voluntary Self-Disclosure: Microsoft Corporation of Redmond, Washington, voluntarily disclosed the violations to both BIS and OFAC and cooperated fully with the investigation.
Federal Express
September 2020 Editionと同じ内容。
September 2020 Edition
Federal Express
The Violation: On 53 occasions between 2011 and 2012, Federal Express (FedEx), located in Memphis, Tennessee, facilitated the export of civil aircraft parts and equipment used for electronic microscope manufacturing classified under ECCN 9A991 or 7A994, or designated EAR99, and valued at approximately $58,091 from the United States to Aerotechnic France (Aerotechnic), or to the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) in Pakistan, without the required BIS licenses. Aerotechnic was added to the BIS Entity List in June 2011 “based on evidence that [it had] engaged in actions that could enhance the military capability of Iran, a country designated by the U.S. Secretary of State as having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism…[and] because [its] overall conduct pose(d) a risk of ongoing EAR violations.” PINSTECH is a subordinate entity of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and has been on the BIS Entity List since November 1988, when it was added along with a number of other Pakistani government (parastatal and private) entities involved in nuclear or missile activities shortly after Pakistan detonated a nuclear device. This case resulted from an investigation conducted by OEE’s Miami Field Office.
The Penalty: On April 24, 2018 FedEx agreed to pay a $500,000 civil penalty.
Kintetsu World Express (U.S.A.), Inc.
January 2017 Editionと同じ内容
January 2017 Edition
Kintetsu World Express (U.S.A.), Inc.
株式会社近鉄エクスプレスの米国拠点
The Violation: In 2010, Kintetsu World Express (U.S.A.), Inc. (KWE) of East Rutherford, New Jersey, caused, aided and/or abetted an act prohibited by EAR. Specifically, KWE, acting as a freight forwarder, facilitated the export of three spiral duct production machines and related accessories, designated as EAR99 and valued at $250,000, from the United States to China National Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC) in the People’s Republic of China without the required U.S. government authorization. At the time of the export, CPMIEC appeared on the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control Specially Designated Nationals List because it had supplied Iran’s military and Iranian proliferators with missile-related dual-use items. This case resulted from an investigation conducted by OEE’s New York Field Office.
The Penalty: On September 26, 2014, KWE agreed to pay a $30,000 civil penalty.
Federal Express
The Violation: Federal Express (FedEx), located in Memphis, Tennessee, was charged with six violations. One two occasions in 2006, FedEx caused, aided and abetted acts prohibited by the EAR when it facilitated the attempted unlicensed export of a PC dialogic board, designated as EAR99, and electronic equipment, classified under ECCN 5A991, from the United States to Mayrow in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The Mayrow case, set forth on page 26, involved the procurement of electronic components for use in IEDs against U.S. and coalition forces. The exports to Mayrow were thwarted when delivery was halted at OEE’s direction. Also, in December 2005, FedEx violated the EAR when it facilitated the unlicensed export of flight simulation software classified under ECCN 4A994 to Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA aka Beihang University), an organization on the BIS Entity List. Lastly, FedEx facilitated the unlicensed export of EAR99 printer components from the United States to end-users in Syria. This case resulted from an investigation conducted by OEE’s San Jose, Miami, and Boston Field Offices.
The Penalty: On December 2011, FedEx agreed to pay a $370,000 civil penalty.
July 2008 Edition
Yamada America, Inc.
株式会社ヤマダコーポレーションの米国拠点
The Violation: Between 2001 and 2005, Yamada America, Inc., an Illinois company, exported diaphragm pumps to Taiwan, Singapore, Brazil and Ecuador without the required licenses. In addition, Yamada made false
statements on export control documents in connection with these shipments.
The Penalty: Yamada America agreed to pay an administrative penalty of $220,000.
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/358-e1066/file
JSR Micro Inc.
JSR株式会社の米国拠点
The Violation: Between 2004 and 2005, JSR Micro Inc., of Sunnyvale, California, exported photoresists, items controlled for national security and anti-terrorism reasons, to Israel, Taiwan and Singapore, without the
required U.S. government authorizations. In addition, JSR Micro Inc. made false or misleading representations, statements, or certifications on Shipper’s Export Declarations regarding the authorization of the exports.
The Penalty: JSR Micro Inc., agreed to pay a $270,000 administrative penalty.
Mitigating Circumstances: JSR Micro Inc. voluntarily self-disclosed these violations and cooperated fully with the investigation.
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/391-e1099/file
Fujitsu Network Communications, Inc.
富士通株式会社の米国拠点
The Violation: On 21 occasions between 1996 and 2000, Fujitsu Network Communications, Inc. of Richardson, Texas failed to obtain the required BIS licenses for the release of controlled technology to foreign nationals from the PRC and Ukraine employed by the firm in the U.S. to conduct research on the development and manufacturing of commercial digital fiber optic transmission and broadband switching equipment, software, and technology controlled for national security reasons.
The Penalty: Fujitsu agreed to pay a $125,000 administrative penalty.
Mitigating Circumstance: Fujitsu voluntarily self-disclosed the violations and cooperated fully with the investigation.
米国商務省BISのExport Violationsに記載の会社
米国商務省BIS、EARの違反事例について、
BISのHPで公開しています（2007年以降）。
その中で、「Don't let this happen to you」に登場しなかった、知られている会社、日本に関係する会社をピックアップしました。
Marubeni Citizen-Cincom Inc.
シチズンマシナリー株式会社の米国拠点
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/421-e2029/file
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