Neither arbitrary nor logical

Gendlin’s basic idea in “A Process Model” is as follows:

It is just my point that a process differs both from arbitrariness and from logic. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 47; cf. Tanaka, 2024, June)

I will attempt to illustrate both aspects, neither of which should be lacking.

A process differs from arbitrariness.

What he means by “it differs both from arbitrariness” is that it is not “anything goes.”

For example, between hunger and eating there is a change, but this isn't just any kind of change, as from hunger to being poisoned, or being temporarily shifted to pain, flight, anxiety, or sexual intercourse. Eating thus has a very specific relation to being hungry, although it is certainly a change. (Gendlin, 1973, p. 325; cf. Tanaka, 2024, September)

Any moment of bodily living thus “implies” or tends toward further living, but not just anything one pleases, only just certain different looking steps. (Gendlin, 1973, p. 325; cf. Tanaka, 2024, September)

Despite a great complexity of implicit aspects, there is a focus, a specific direction ... which is manifest in the fact that not just any step carries forward. (Gendlin, 1973, p. 326; cf. Tanaka, 2024, April)

... it is misleading to call it [implying] “change” as if it simply implied just anything else. Implying implies something so intricate that only a very special occurring “changes” it as it implies itself changed. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 13)

A process differs from logic.

What he means by “it differs both from logic” is that it is not like the deduction in Euclidean geometry, which could not be any other way and goes one way.

Food and all its characteristics are implicit in hunger. But hunger could also be carried forward by something new. The implicit is never only formed. Intravenous feeding can carry digestion forward and so can odd foods. (Gendlin, 1984, p. 100)

Implying is always open, and what occurs into it does not equal it. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 66)

Since there is always implying, all occurring happens “into implying,” but not always as the implying implies. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 13)

The environment may or may not occur somewhat as the body implies. (Gendlin, fair copy, p. 5; 2012, p. 146; 2018, p. 116)

What occurs is a new formation, whether familiar to the observer or unusual. Eating is familiar to the observer, but intravenous feeding also carries the process forward. (Gendlin, 1997/2018, p. 66)

References

Gendlin, E.T. (1973). Experiential psychotherapy. In R. Corsini (Ed.), Current psychotherapies (pp. 317–52). Peacock.

Gendlin, E.T. (1984). The client’s client: the edge of awareness. In R.L. Levant & J.M. Shlien (Eds.), Client-centered therapy and the person-centered approach: new directions in theory, research, and practice (pp. 76–107). Praeger.

Gendlin, E. T. (1997/2018). A process model. Northwestern University Press.

Gendlin, E.T. (2012). Implicit precision. In Z. Radman (Ed.), Knowing without thinking (pp. 141-166). Palgrave Macmillan.

Gendlin, E.T. (2018). Saying what we mean (edited by E.S. Casey, & D.M. Schoeller). Northwestern University Press.

Tanaka, H. (2024, March). History of Chapters II and I Use of the Term “Implying” in “A Process Model”: Genealogy from Classical Pragmatism.

Tanaka, H. (2024, April). Gendlin’s “focaling” and Dilthey’s “purposiveness.”

Tanaka, H. (2024, June). Gendlin’s most important idea.