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How I Needed to Shut Down NEXAS Academia in One Year

Harry @forCreators

(This is the official translation to my original blog post in Japanese.)


Introduction

I’m Harry, CEO from a company “forCreators.”
We established the company in Singapore in October 2023, and now, as we finish Q1 of our second fiscal year, we’re operating as a startup.
This article is about how I launched an "English-focused V-Mobile live-streamer agency" (I will explain the definition later) and, in just one year, ended up shutting it down. As I write this note on January 31, 2025—the final day of the agency—I thought it would be a good milestone to look back on everything from founding the company up to the pivot in our business.
The title makes it sound like a bold story, but it’s not a tale of heroic feats at all. I made a ton of mistakes and have many regrets. I’m writing this from my perspective in the hope that it helps someone out there. Think of it like a “lesson in failure” as a management.

Why an English-Speaking V-Mobile live-streamer agency?

First of all, let me talk about why I decided to start an English-focused V-Mobile live-streamer agency—what motivated me and what led up to it.

Definition of Mobile live-streamer agency

(This is an additional paragraph to the original Japanese version to make sure the definitions)
But before moving on, please allow me to explain the definition of the term “V-Mobile live-streamer agency” as it is where most of the misinterpretations happen between Asian and Western audience and I’d like you all to understand the difference with “VTuber agency” correctly.
In Japan, there is a distinction between “VTuber agencies” (managing online entertainers who primarily stream on platforms like YouTube or Twitch, using anime-style avatars) and “ライバー事務所" = ”Mobile live-streamer agency” (managing live streamers on mobile-specific apps).

What It Means:
A V-Mobile live-streamer agency is an agency focused on managing virtual streamers who primarily live-stream on smartphone-based streaming apps such as Reality, IRIAM, TikTok Live etc. These streaming apps are popular in Asia and increasingly worldwide for casual, smartphone-driven live content. Unlike a typical VTuber agency that might have fewer talents streaming on big global platforms like YouTube/Twitch, Mobile live-streamer agency often has very large numbers of talents—sometimes 100, 500, or even over 1,000 under one agency.

Why It’s Different from a VTuber Agency:
• Platform Focus: They focus on apps meant for mobile devices, often designed for real-time audience interaction, gifting (tipping), and casual chats.
• Talent Numbers: Because it’s a volume-driven business (many smaller streamers vs. a few top earners), these agencies tend to recruit or manage far more talents.

The whole concept of NEXAS is coming from this “V-Mobile live-streamer agency” instead of “VTuber agency”.

(back to the article)

What I Used to Do & What I Want to Do

I’m half Japanese, half Taiwanese, grew up loving anime, manga, and all sorts of content, and spent my college days more on studying abroad and interning overseas than actually going to class. I joined a company running one of the live streaming apps called 17LIVE (pronounced “ichinana”) as a new graduate in October 2019, about half a year before COVID started. For about three years, I worked as an assistant to the CEO at the Global CEO’s Office under Mr. Ono at the time.
While there, I experienced the live streaming industry’s explosive growth during the pandemic, witnessed how 17LIVE tried to expand into the U.S. and the Middle East and failed, and watched as everything gradually got taken over by TikTok Live. It was a jam-packed three years, after which I went independent. For about a year, I worked in the entertainment and Web3 spaces as a freelance business developer and marketer with a strong passion for "Creator Economy" industry, and then I founded my company.
Having an interest in leveraging my strengths—global business, entertainment, the creator economy—I began exploring possible ventures. That’s when I set my sights on the overseas VTuber market. I thought: “I want to take on the challenge in oversea markets with a culture that originated in Japan.” Right before founding the company, I traveled around anime conventions in Southeast Asia and North America, arranged meetings with local VTuber agency CEOs, and gathered insights into those markets, forming a few hypotheses along the way.

Initial Hypotheses and Goals

① A Time Lag of Several Years Between Japan and the Global Market

VTubers are one of the rare new forms of culture to originate in Japan. A major trend started in Japan and spread worldwide thanks to companies like COVER and ANYCOLOR, but each market seems to be in a slightly different phase. I got the impression that today’s Japan might be where overseas markets will be in a few years (maybe 3–4 years later).

② A Coming Wave of the “Long Tail”

When I talked to people in the overseas V community, every single one of them said that YouTube and Twitch are oversaturated—too many competitors. But they had no viable alternatives. In Japan, platforms like Reality or IRIAM serve as next steps, but overseas, that hasn’t fully developed yet. Reality is growing explosively in North America, but I heard from creators that making an avatar in the U.S. is extremely expensive (local illustrators can cost more than double compared to Japan). It’s just not feasible for many. In Japan, you can find cheaper options on sites like Coconala or BOOTH, but that’s not really accessible there. I felt that as more people try to become VTubers, the rise of long-tail content creators would inevitably arrive. (“Long-tail” is a business term referring to the idea that in the digital age, niche content or smaller-scale creators collectively attract a significant audience. Rather than having only a few mainstream “hits” or top stars, an increasing number of smaller creators can survive and thrive because the internet lowers distribution and marketing costs.)

A simplified diagram that appeared in my pitch deck

Because the business model of a “V-Mobile live-streamer agency” is heavily dependent on platforms, it’s relatively easy to generate revenue without burning too much capital as long as the platforms can pay us well, compared to straight into competitive platforms like YouTube and Twitch where there are no platform bonus such things. My idea was to run a V-Mobile live-streamer agency to generate sustainable cash flow, strengthen our network, and leverage this foundation to explore new opportunities within the industry. (one of the idea that I’ve been explaining to talents was establishing the “VTuber agency” that focus on multi-platforms on top of NEXAS).

Concerns About the “Value” of an Agency

However, I’ve always had major concerns about the “agency model.”
• The Evolving Creator Economy is Reducing the Value of Agencies
Thanks to more online tools, creators can now independently gather information, find work, and produce content. I feel that it’s getting harder to define an agency’s exclusive value—things only an agency can do. Meanwhile, a liver agency’s model often depends on volume: rather than having 10 talents who each earn 10 million yen, it’s about having 100 talents who each earn 1 million yen. When I was at 17LIVE, I saw many so-called “management” agencies that basically took fees without really supporting their talents. I strongly did not want to become that kind of exploitative agency. Yet, genuinely comprehensive support for each talent is very difficult to scale. Because each talent doesn’t earn a huge amount individually in this model, the management cost allocated per talent inevitably has to be lower than agencies exclusively select only a few talents.

• Cultural Differences in North America
In North America, there really aren’t “streamer agencies” in this model; there are barely any agencies that manage over 10 VTubers. How do you build credibility when you want to manage a large number of talents in a market where the word “Agency” can have a very different nuance than the one in Japan? In Japan, the company often has a stronger position than creators. In North America, it’s the complete opposite: the talent hires the company to do what they can’t do alone. Unless you deliver a clear benefit they can’t get independently, it’s not really an “Agency.” I’d been thinking about this business model since before founding the company: “How can we export the Japanese ‘streamer agency’ model to North America?”


The Answer for myself: The “Academia” Concept

In the midst of all this, we came up with what we called the “Academia” model.
• Aim for an Agency Like “My Hero Academia”
We envisioned a “academy” where people who want to become VTubers gather to learn, compete, and push one another to grow. We’d provide regular lectures, shared assets, and bonuses as incentives. In return, from the outset, we would not offer extensive one-on-one management to talents. We invited talents who understood and accepted that approach by explaining the concept many times during auditions and selection process, as we understand that this is far from most of the current VTuber agencies.

MHA concept

• Become a Launchpad for the Next Generation of VTubers
Our idea was to serve as an “academia” for prospective VTubers. Rather than starting out on YouTube or Twitch, we’d have them begin their careers on a new mobile streaming platform. The best of them—those who achieved results—would move up to a “full-service talent agency” that offered more management resources and multi-platform options, aiming to become top stars. That was the ideal blueprint we had in mind.

The first thing I wanted to realize after NEXAS stabilized.

Initial Launch

The first few months were nothing but trial and error.

Days Spent Talking with Talents


• “Door-Knocking” on English-Speaking Talents
First, we hired an American staff member. We asked him to contact as many independent VTubers and streamers as possible. Anyone who showed interest was then scheduled for an online meeting with me. Since I was based in Asia and our talents were in North America, it was normal to have meetings in the middle of the night. I’m not a native English speaker, but when you talk to new people daily, you get pretty comfortable quickly getting to know each other.

Positive Reactions from Talents

• Building a Community with a “One-Team Feeling”
Through repeated pitches—introducing myself, our concept, and asking them to join us as talents—many people responded positively to the idea of NEXAS. They seemed to like our concept, the idea of connecting with other like-minded talents, and being part of a community. I was recruiting them the same way a startup recruits its early team members: “Join this brand-new ship!” We successfully interviewed and welcomed new talents into the community, and they naturally gathered in our Discord voice chats to play games all night and hang out. Early on, there was a strongly positive atmosphere—I really felt the excitement of something new beginning.

Marketing Strategy: How Do We Dispel Concerns About an Unknown Agency?

With our first wave of about 30 talents ready to debut, we moved on to the launch marketing. As a new player without major backing or a proven track record, earning trust was key for us to gain fans in the English-speaking market. That’s where we turned to collaborations with high-profile, established talents.
Through introductions and random DMs, I managed to connect with well-known ENVTubers like filian and lopi, who graciously agreed to share their insights with our talents as “guest lecturers.”

They talked about how they grew their subscriber base from thousands to hundreds of thousands, how they create their content, their daily routines, and mindset. They packed an incredible amount of knowledge into those sessions. As a moderator, I was also a huge fan, so I couldn’t help asking a bunch of questions—I truly can’t thank them enough.

A Huge Controversy and Its Aftermath

Just when we were all set and ready—right before the group’s debut streams went live—it happened.
The Storm of Negative Comments

We posted about the “Academia concept,” our plan to debut 27 talents over 3 days, and the schedule we’d been preparing for months. But the response was a flood of harsh comments:
“This definitely won’t work.”
“This defies all known conventions.”
“Why would they do something so reckless?”
“Who’s this idiot founder?”
We saw a barrage of negativity. From their perspective, they knew nothing about us, we were launching a large number of unknown talents on an unfamiliar platform—it’s understandable that they were confused. Still, some comments took aim at the talents themselves, calling them stupid for joining this new agency. They really hurt the talents’ motivation.
Honestly, seeing something you worked on for over half a year get torn apart right before your eyes was emotionally overwhelming. I got a bit emotional, responded to some of the comments in a confrontational tone, and ended up pouring more fuel on the fire—something I deeply regret.

Have You Heard of “Dramatubers”?

Like everywhere else, the world loves gossip and scandals, so there are always creators hungry for drama. We became fresh prey for those “Dramatubers.” Right before our talents’ debuts, they dug up my LinkedIn, X, and past company info, misinterpret everything, and bashed us on their channels. I remember going numb, emotionally, watching it happen.
I couldn’t think straight. I canceled all my meetings and spent five hours at a nearby sauna meditating, trying to reset my mindset. I pulled myself together because the debut streams were starting the next day. I apologized to the talents, telling everyone—including myself—“We just have to do our best and not overthink it.”

Merry’s “Public Interrogation” Stream?

While the flames were still raging, I got a DM from Merryweather, one of the top English VTubers with 400k followers on X, 500k on YouTube, and 300k on Twitch: “Wanna talk about this on my channel?” He himself runs a Webtoon company and a VTuber agency, so he was genuinely interested in our concept. On my side, I thought, “If we don’t clear up the misunderstanding here, we won’t get another chance,” so I decided to appear on Merry’s show.

It was a gamble. I’m not a native English speaker, and I might not be able to explain what I truely intended clearly. They could easily twist my words, turning it into prime content for Dramatubers. It would be a live broadcast with no pre-submitted questions—basically a possible “public execution.”
However, people who knew Merry told me that he’s not someone who maliciously attacks guests; he takes a fair stance, aligning with fans but also expressing his own views. So, I resolved to be totally honest, straightforward, and passionate, focusing on correcting misconceptions. I spent 1.5 hours answering tough questions from Merry and his fans, sweating through my English. Before going live, I was so nervous I couldn’t eat. But thankfully, I didn’t say anything that caused more misunderstanding, I guess.

Thank you so much for giving me an opportunity, Merry.

• Outcome: Merry and I Became Good Friends
After that, Merry openly supported NEXAS. The negative comments subsided because “If Merry endorses them, maybe it’s okay.” He even volunteered to hold special lectures for us. We ended up going out to eat together, and he really saved us. I cannot thank you enough.

Early Successes

Thanks to that controversy, ironically, our name got more attention. The debut performance on launch day was great. The talents had prepared a ton, performed amazingly and viewers were excited. At that time, our partner platform was pumping in big promotional budgets, so the more the talents streamed, the more they earned. Some of the streamers even earned more than $2,000 in their first month of streaming, which is extremely difficult if you start your streaming career on YouTube or Twitch (this is a public info). The events were highly competitive. It had that early-stage thrill unique to a new live streaming app.

400 Applicants Right After the Debut

Even after all that drama, we still had 400 people who resonated with our concept and wanted to join. This confirmed our initial hunch about a growing long-tail market, new platforms, and an appetite for a new kind of agency.

(Thanks VTuber NewsDrop for the feature.)

Why the Agency Couldn’t Continue

Although our “debut fest” was a major success, things started unraveling quickly about three months later.

The Lure of Other Platforms
Again, in Japan, “VTuber” and “V-Mobile streamer (Vライバー)” are distinct concepts, so you don’t have to explain the difference. VTubers are mostly interpreted as virtual influencers that stream on YouTube. V-mobile streamers are mostly focusing on smartphone-based streaming app (such as Reality, IRIAM, TikTok Live etc). But in North America, the line doesn't even exist. Everyone pretty much wants to be a “VTuber”, and nobody specifically aims only for mobile streaming.

• “Why Not Stream on YouTube?”
When talents interacted with other VTubers on X (Twitter), they’d be invited to collaborate on YouTube. But early on, we had exclusive conditions with our partner platform that restricted multi-platform streaming, because that was the strategy where talents and company could get benefits from, such as monetary bonus, from the partnered platform. So, our talents had to say, “Sorry, the agency won’t let me stream on other platforms.” People’s reaction was, “That sucks,” and the negativity spread among creators. When we loosened the restrictions in response, talents understandably migrated to “the more fun” option. As a result, our main platform strategy started to crumble. Please don't get me wrong. This is not to blame talents, at all. It's a failure of management to build the balanced guidelines and operations.

The Challenge of Promoting Commitment

• Contracts That Don’t Force Streaming Hours
When you run a global agency, there are many legal and cultural constraints. If you try to impose streaming hours as a requirement, you start to encroach on “employee” status under U.S. or local labor laws, which places a huge burden on the company. So our contract had to be relaxed in that sense, making it impossible to enforce something as crucial as streaming hours—arguably the most important element for the business. Looking back, I think we could have found ways around this, like not mandating streaming hours explicitly but using indirect methods (e.g., “If you don’t meet the streaming minimum for no explicit reasons, we part ways”) to get the business going.

• Differences in Attitude Toward Mental Health
There’s a big cultural difference between Japan and the West regarding mental health. It’s difficult to convey this in writing without misunderstanding, but from a management standpoint, the typical Japanese approach of pushing and encouraging talent to work through tough times can be very problematic in a Western context. Japanese, or even Asian management culture emphasizes persistence and endurance, while Western approaches often prioritize individual mental well-being. Every new creator knows that in the early days, you won’t get many viewers. It’s not always fun. But pushing them just a bit harder so that they can break through was extremely difficult from a communication standpoint. Some talents did keep streaming consistently without any push, but for the level of success we needed, it was tough to get a high enough percentage of them to do so. (For those who don’t know, the streaming hours and consistency are the two biggest key factors to drive revenues and bonus in the mobile streaming apps. I guess ex-NEXAS talents can sense it as all the bonus structures were designed purely based on these two metrics on the partnered platform).

• Rising Staff Costs
Around the same time, ANYCOLOR’s NIJISANJI EN got embroiled in a massive controversy. In short, it was the clash of Japanese management styles and Western talents. Top talents started leaving. An Asia-based staff tried to manage North American talents, and the gap between the company and creators grew bigger and bigger. Eventually, the departing talent ignored NDA restrictions and leaked internal details, forcing CEO Tazumi to post an apology video.

(A real lawyer streaming a public review of NIJISANJI’s leaked contract… a nightmare for any kind of business owners.)

Talents saw all this happening. To avoid a similar fate, we felt pressured to hire staff living in the same time zones as our talents, which of course meant higher labor costs. Because we were trying to recruit talents at a rapid pace, we also needed more managers. Our cash flow was draining quickly. In hindsight, we should have slowed down. We got carried away with an unrealistic pace of growth in talent acquisition and team expansion, which I deeply regret.

The Partner Platform’s Rapid Decline

• End of the “Money-Splash” Period
At first, the platform was showering creators with bonus campaigns, which let our top talents earn a lot. But as soon as that ended, they suddenly weren’t making nearly as much. This was similar to what happened when Pococha and 17LIVE withdrew from the U.S. The local tipping culture in North America is different and weaker. Also, people care about what percentage of their tip actually goes to the streamer. It was hard to justify the same high-level tipping approach used in Asia. Gradually, we realized that talents couldn’t earn as much as we had hoped.

• AI Controversies → Boycott
The ENVTuber community in particular was extremely critical of AI. Many believed AI art steals illustrators’ jobs, so anyone using AI art was an enemy. Our partner platform was actively developing AI-based features for streamers and to expand the creator base, which set off a huge backlash. Talents, not wanting to be labeled as “the people who support AI,” left the platform. They didn’t want to get caught in the crossfire and simply declared, “I’m not streaming here anymore.”
Sure, streaming on YouTube or Twitch didn’t necessarily mean they’d make more money immediately at all. In terms of time efficiency, streaming on partnered platforms is still more profitable for both the talent and the company. However at that point, it felt like things gradually spiraled out of control.

This is how our original strategy and business model fell apart.

A Negative Spiral in the Community

Our Discord server was initially meant to be a place for everyone to grow together and compete positively. But it gradually turned into a hotbed of complaints.
In voice chats, a few members would vent about our management and the platform. They criticized our decision to keep recruiting new talents rapidly, as well as how we manage talents. I wanted to shut down the community function altogether, but staff argued that removing it would kill our agency’s core value. Meanwhile, negativity in the community led some members to take breaks from streaming. Rather than inspiring each other, the community had become a place that discouraged people from trying—absolutely the worst scenario. I completely failed to design the community in the way that I originally intended.

The Crossroads

At this point, it was clear we had to make a drastic change. To this stage, we have already invested a lot just to produce the Live2D models for all the talents, keep the academia running and make sure talents always have some talent managers to talk to. We hadn’t been able to make the projected return on the investment due to the various factors explained above. I needed to face the reality, seeing the decline of company cash level every month in the rapid pace.

① Fundamental Reforms (Operations, Contracts, etc.)

We could double down on the original strategy, risk losing many talents, but introduce stronger contractual obligations.

② Change Our Main Platform

We could pivot to YouTube or Twitch, which talents actually wanted. But after speaking with other small and mid-sized NA agency owners, I realized almost no one was doing well financially. The only agencies surviving after starting around 2023 or later were either well-funded (big corpo) or had other businesses that could subsidize the investment needed to scale. We, as a startup company, didn’t have any other business projects that could produce profit to invest back to NEXAS project. Continuing the current operations means starting the countdown to the bankrupt, which I really needed to avoid.

Ultimately, I had to admit that our initial hypotheses were off, and I had to accept that it would be very hard to pull off a miraculous comeback in the same direction.

Pivot and the Future of NEXAS

We decided it was no longer sustainable to operate as a V-Mobile live-streamer agency and shifted toward closing the agency function.

Rethinking the Talent Agency Model

• Scouting Established Talents Is More Rational
In many talent industries—music, IRL influencers, etc.—it’s become standard to scout and support individuals who already have some traction or are beginning to grow, rather than grooming total newbies from scratch. In the VTuber world, it’s still common to produce talents from scratch, largely because companies want to create new character IPs. But look at VShojo, a well-known name in the West and Japan: they don’t own the IP; they just act as an agency for sponsorships, merch, etc. Brave Group’s V4Mirai is also bringing in already-active indie talents (they call it “adoption”). Even Hololive’s new group “FLOW GLOW” features people with backgrounds in AKB groups, or established YouTubers. The tide is changing.

how cool they are.

• Streamer Agencies Depend Entirely on Platforms
Instead of splitting revenue with each talent, you might explore a B2B model where the platform pays you a management fee or bonuses, which NEXAS was mostly based on. We didn’t take any of cut from all the revenues talents made on the partnered platforms. But you’d still be very dependent on the platform. If streaming on the platform isn’t as monetizable for talents as other mainstream platforms, or if the bonus structure for agencies is weak, you can’t sustain the business. Especially in live streaming apps, there’s a massive difference in how much a streamer can earn depending on the platform. I’ve seen cases where a talent moved from one platform to 17LIVE and tripled their revenue, then doubled it again on TikTok Live without changing contents much. We at NEXAS couldn’t utilize those dynamics effectively.

• Feature-Focused Agencies Could Be the Future
Instead of full-spectrum management, focusing on specific functions like sponsorship sales, merch, content production, or mental health support—and generating revenue without taking a cut directly from the talent—might be the sustainable path. That does deviate from the traditional approach of a VTuber agency “creating” new IP from scratch, but you can have an agency that specializes in “expanding” or “monetizing” IP.

Ending NEXAS’s Role as a Talent Agency

• Officially Closing on January 31, 2025
For talents who wanted to keep their avatars, we gave options to keep the rights so they could continue independently. A lot of people worked hard in so many ways, and I regret not being able to nurture each person or make our vision of growing both individual talents and the agency a reality. We ended up causing a lot of confusion with our sudden closure, and I feel incredibly sorry. I genuinely hope they keep working toward their dreams at their own pace.
The week I had to discuss the closure and contract terminations with the teammates who had supported me since the early days was simply one of the most humiliating and painful moments of my life.

• Response to the Closure Announcement
In early December 2024, we announced the closure. Some people said, “I knew it wouldn’t last,” but overall, many asked, “Why shut down?” and expressed disappointment. I’m grateful that we managed to gain supporters in such a short time. Thank you so much for believing in us.

Rebranding NEXAS

• The Overseas VTuber Industry Continues to Grow
During NEXAS’s operations, we built a valuable network with agencies and indie talents in North America and Southeast Asia. I still believe in the potential of this global VTuber market, even if the approach of running an agency wasn’t the right fit. While people in Japan might not know much, on Twitch, one of the top channels with the highest number of active subscribers is Ironmouse from VShojo. Another example: filian’s videos, including clip compilations, get over 100 million views a month. The top talents are quickly moving into the cultural mainstream.

• A Global VTuber Agency Model
Building on the network and brand we have, I want to become the first company brands call when they want to do a cross-border project involving VTubers and anime-style influencers around the world. That’s my vision for now.

New identity.

Back to the Drawing Board (While Still Exploring)

That said, I’m not certain that doing this alone is our end goal. Growth in this sector is slower than expected, so just being a marketing/advertising agency might be tough. But you have to find something to survive as a business company. Although I know the startup mantra is always “FOCUS,” I’ll likely be experimenting across a range of opportunities to see where we can invest our resources next.

What Our Company Wants to Do
Our company’s goal remains the same: to support creators and generate new culture worldwide. That means helping creators bridge Japan and overseas markets, and vice versa.
• Sometimes we’ll help export Japanese creators, content, or culture abroad
• Other times we’ll help bring overseas creators, content, or culture to Japan
Right now, two small lines of business are generating some revenue:

  1. Creator Support

  2. Roblox Business

Creator Support Services

This includes supporting Japanese creators in expanding overseas and helping English-speaking creators enter Japan. It’s still experimental, but we have team members with experience at MyAnimeList and Tokyo Otaku Mode, as well as an overseas influencer in-house. We’re pooling our knowledge to build services only we can provide.

Roblox Business

I met a 21-year-old talented entrepreneur here in Malaysia, and we’re co-developing Roblox solutions for IP holders. The number of examples in Japan is slowly increasing, and I believe Roblox is currently the quickest route to accessing a global audience for IP holders.
• Over 380 million monthly users
• Gen Z/Alpha spend an average of 3 hours a day on it

It’s already spawning new games and IPs. My partner company has been heavily involved in Roblox projects for TWICE and BLACKPINK, successfully building fan communities there. Now major IPs like "ONE PIECE" and "Attack on Titan" have also started venturing into Roblox, indicating this is quite different from the short-lived “metaverse marketing” trend from a few years ago.
Leveraging that partner’s operational knowledge and development resources—and combining them with our ability to bring in an audience from outside the platform—we’re co-creating solutions for global brand IPs. If you have even a slight interest, I’d love to talk!

Conclusion — Moving Forward After Failure

Our one-year attempt at running an English V-Mobile live-streamer agency ultimately ended in “failure.”
During that year, I kept running into walls, painfully aware of my own shortcomings, as I tried to shape the business. It was mentally tough at times, but I also learned an enormous amount.

If you’ve read this far, thank you so much:
• If you want to do any anime- or VTuber-related promotions abroad
• If you want to leverage IP in Roblox
• If you’re curious about cross-border, creative ventures connecting Japan and the world
• Or if you’re simply interested in me or forCreators itself
Please feel free to get in touch for any reason. I’m still lacking in many ways, but I’ll keep moving and searching for the next big opportunity.

Thank you so much for reading up to this point!
And to everyone who supported or was involved with us, thank you from the bottom of my heart!

To the Talents Reading This

I truly apologize for dragging you through so many changes. Seeing everyone create content day after day while dealing with their own struggles gave me enormous strength. I sincerely hope you’ll continue pursuing your dreams at your own pace.
Finally, this article is not meant to blame anyone, at all. This is just a self-reflection to acknowledge my failure in company management and my failure to build a better operational system that could have sustained the business I originally envisioned. However it is still something I can learn from for my next ventures.

Thank you again, and I look forward to staying in touch in the future.

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