China and the World, CRS, IF12271, Dec. 7, 2022.

Caitlin Campbell, Susan V. Lawrence, and Karen M. Sutter

The Biden Administration has described the United States
as engaged in “a strategic competition to shape the future of
the international order,” with the United States’ main
competitor being the People’s Republic of China (PRC or
China), led by the Communist Party of China (CPC). U.S.
policymakers and analysts assess many CPC ambitions and
PRC actions as challenging the U.S. national interest and
U.S. global leadership. Debates concerning China,
including in the U.S. Congress, center on how to respond to
or counter negative aspects of the PRC’s growing global
influence, including PRC actions that may be coercive or
otherwise undermine long-standing international rules and
norms. Legislation and congressional oversight have often
sought to press the executive branch to act in areas in which
it has existing authorities, but, in Congress’s assessment,
has not acted sufficiently to address PRC activities.

Source CRS

The PRC’s Global Presence

Examples of the PRC’s growing global presence and
congressional responses include

• Trade and Investment. China has become a top global
  investor and financier as its companies have moved
  offshore to access raw materials, commodities, and

• energy; acquire foreign technology and related
  capabilities; and build infrastructure. Members of
  Congress have sought to address the growing role of the
  PRC state (i.e., Communist Party, military, and
  government) in the commercial ecosystem and in
  supporting and directing PRC industries’ operations,
  both overseas and domestically. Members have also
  sought to address asymmetrical market access terms the
  PRC sets for foreign firms, under which China restricts
  foreign firms’ ability to compete in China even as PRC
  firms expand and acquire foreign firms and capabilities
  in the same sectors overseas. Members have sought to
  strengthen U.S. authorities and collaboration with like-
  minded countries to address PRC industrial policies that
  require technology transfer to China and incentivize
  China’s acquisition of foreign technology by all means,
  including theft.

• Belt and Road. Through its Belt and Road Initiative
  (BRI), also known as “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR),
  launched in 2013, the PRC has sought to develop China-
  centered and China-controlled global infrastructure,
  transportation, trade, production networks, and
  standards. The PRC states that it has signed documents
  outlining BRI cooperation with 149 countries and 32
  international organizations. In 2018, Congress passed
  legislation to restructure existing U.S. development
  financing authorities to provide developing countries
  alternatives to PRC investment and financing.

• International Organizations. China has sought
  influence in the United Nations and global technical
  bodies to legitimize its approach to such diverse issues
  as Taiwan, human rights, and the role of the state in the
  economy. As China’s economic heft has grown, so has
  its ability to affect outcomes within these institutions.
  China has steadily increased its role in the World Bank,
  the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade
  Organization. It has also increased its involvement in
  technical and standard-setting bodies of the UN and
  other institutions. Members have sought to counter
  China’s influence in these bodies by seeking to expand
  the U.S. role and by pressing for more active
  collaboration with like-minded countries in these fora.

• Coercion. The PRC has increasingly engaged in
  sustained, punitive campaigns of diplomatic and
  economic pressure against governments and commercial
  actors the CPC deems to be challenging China’s
  interests. In 2021, the PRC cut off direct and secondary
  trade with U.S. ally Lithuania over Vilnius’ approval of
  an unofficial Taiwanese Representative Office. In 2020,
  the PRC targeted U.S. ally Australia after Canberra
  called for an independent inquiry into the origins of the
  COVID-19 pandemic. Members have sought to support
  governments and firms subjected to such coercion.

• Discourse. The PRC has increasingly sought to shape
  global discourse about China and the United States. It
  has invested heavily in expanding the global reach of its
  state media organizations, undertaken disinformation
  campaigns, and pressured international organizations,
  governments, and corporations to include PRC-
  approved language in their official documents and
  speeches. Members of Congress have responded, in part,
  by establishing the State Department’s Global
  Engagement Center and increasing funding for entities
  overseen by the U.S. Agency for Global Media.

• Diplomacy. The PRC has established new fora to
  facilitate its engagement across whole regions, such as
  its Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The PRC has
  also sought to expand the influence of other groupings
  that do not include the United States, including the
  Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose eight full
  members include Russia. Members have sought to step
  up U.S. regional engagement, including through
  appropriations earmarked for countering PRC influence.

• Military Operations. The PLA maintains a regular
  presence in China’s immediate maritime periphery and,
  following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022
  visit to Taiwan, increased its military activity around
  Taiwan. The PLA also increasingly operates beyond the
  Western Pacific. The PLA Navy has conducted
  continuous anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden since
  2008, undertaken military diplomacy around the world,
  and conducted joint military exercises and patrols with
  its partners—primarily Russia—in the Bering Sea,
  Mediterranean Sea, Central Asia, Baltic Sea, East China
  Sea, and elsewhere. Members of Congress have sought
  to strengthen the U.S. military’s ability to compete and
  to bolster Taiwan’s defenses.

• Military Ties. The PRC also maintains military ties
  with U.S. partners and allies, such as Thailand and the
  Philippines, is a top contributor of personnel to UN
  peacekeeping missions, and operates a military base in
  Djibouti. The U.S. Department of Defense reports that
  the PRC may be considering the establishment of
  multiple new military bases around the world.

U.S. and Ally/Partner Responses

In its October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), the
Biden Administration assessed China’s ambitions as being
“to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-
Pacific and to become the world’s leading power.” The
NSS describes the PRC as, “the only competitor with both
the intent to reshape the international order and,
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and
technological power to advance that objective.”
The Administration has focused on coordinating with allies
and partners to shape the strategic environment in which
China operates. This approach seeks to amplify U.S.
messages and make it harder for the PRC to play U.S. allies
and partners against each other. The Administration has
stated that it seeks to “invest in the underlying sources and
tools of American power and influence” and maintain “an
enduring competitive edge over the PRC.” The Department
of Defense treats China as its “pacing threat,” with a
Taiwan contingency the “pacing scenario” for which the
U.S. military is preparing.

With U.S. encouragement, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the European Union, and individual
U.S. allies and partners have joined the United States in
expressing concerns about PRC ambitions and activities.
Maintaining policy alignment has nonetheless proved
challenging at times. Factors such as economic dependence
on China, geographic proximity to China, discomfort with
the Biden Administration’s framing of competition in terms
of democracy versus autocracy, and concerns about
competition leading to conflict shape some governments’
responses. The Administration’s NSS notes that, “Some
parts of the world are uneasy with the competition between
the United States and the world’s largest autocracies,”
adding, “We do not seek conflict or a new Cold War.”

Congress’ Role in China Policy

Congress has sought to influence U.S. policy toward China
in both its oversight and legislative roles. Hearings during
the 117th Congress, for example, covered such topics as
Taiwan policy, U.S.-China relations, U.S.-European
cooperation on China, China’s role in Latin America and
the Caribbean, countering the PRC’s “Economic and
Technological Plan for Dominance,” and the impact of PRC
lending on international debt architecture.
Legislative approaches take many forms, from sense of
Congress statements to legislative directives to legislative
restrictions and funding denials. In the 117th Congress, both
chambers undertook committee action on comprehensive
China-related bills, including S. 1260 and H.R. 3524.
Among those bills enacted into law were P.L. 117-78,
which bars the import of goods made with forced labor in
China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and the
CHIPS Act (P.L. 117-167), which seeks to strengthen U.S.
technological competitiveness through investments in U.S.
semiconductor manufacturing. In addition, H.R. 7776
would include multiple provisions related to China and
Taiwan, including the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act.

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF12271.pdf